Strong opinion, strong protection: Fresh guidance from the Court of Appeal on honest opinion

What happened in Bridgen v Hancock?

In January 2023, former Conservative MP Andrew Bridgen posted a tweet in which he described COVID-19 vaccination, using words attributed to an academic, as “[…] the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust“. Later the same day, Mr Hancock posted a tweet denouncing “the disgusting and dangerous anti-semitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning […]”. Mr Bridgen sued for libel in respect of the reference to antisemitism.

Mr Hancock applied for summary judgment in the High Court, on the basis that Mr Bridgen had no real prospect of defeating Mr Hancock’s honest opinion defence. The High Court Judge refused the application, finding that the merits of Mr Hancock’s defence should be tested at trial. The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Hancock’s appeal and entered summary judgment for Mr Hancock.

What is the defence of honest opinion?

Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides a defence to a claim of defamation where the defendant can show that the statement complained of was:

1. a statement of opinion;
2. that indicated the basis of the opinion; and
3. that an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of a relevant fact or privileged statement (the Objective Honesty Condition).

If those conditions are met, the claimant can still defeat the defence by proving that the defendant did not genuinely hold the opinion expressed (the Dishonesty Disqualification).

The appeal principally concerned the application of the Objective Honesty Condition and the Dishonesty Disqualification.

The approach to honesty

The Court of Appeal clarified that the Objective Honesty Condition is concerned with a narrow question: whether an honest person could have held the opinion in question. It is not an assessment of whether the opinion was fair, reasonable or widely shared. The Court emphasised that the honest opinion defence protects opinions that may be exaggerated, prejudiced, stubborn or even irrational, provided they are genuinely based on the facts relied upon.

Given the undisputed facts that the Holocaust was a deliberate genocidal campaign, that the COVID-19 vaccine programme was a public health initiative intended to save lives, and that Mr Bridgen had compared the two, the Court held that Mr Hancock’s opinion was one that an honest person could hold and that no other conclusion could reasonably be reached at trial.

The Court ultimately agreed with Mr Hancock’s counsel that the law gives a considerable degree of latitude to honest commentators.

Relevance of third-party opinions

The Court provided particularly helpful guidance on the relevance of third-party opinions in assessing the Objective Honesty Condition. The Court held that the views expressed by others about the same matter are not admissible when deciding whether an honest person could have held the opinion. The Court therefore rejected Mr Bridgen’s reliance on evidence of what other commentators thought about the tweet, including a letter from 26 Jewish doctors and scientists. The Court confirmed that the issue is not whether others shared the opinion but whether it was one that an honest person could hold.

This means that a claimant cannot defeat the Objective Honesty Condition simply by pointing to other commentators who disagreed, or arguing that no one else used precisely the same language. Equally, a defendant does not need to prove that other people shared their view.

Dishonesty is a high bar

The Court of Appeal also considered the Dishonesty Disqualification. The Court stressed that this is a separate question from the Objective Honesty Condition. Once the court has determined that the opinion is one that an honest person could hold, the focus shifts to the defendant’s actual state of mind.

The Court emphasised that the threshold to meet the Dishonesty Disqualification is high, as allegations that a defendant did not genuinely hold an opinion are “akin to [allegations of] fraud” and must therefore be supported by strong evidence.

Mr Bridgen argued that Mr Hancock could not genuinely have held his opinion because it was inconsistent with accepted definitions of antisemitism, contradicted by the wording of the original tweet, and motivated by a desire to discredit criticism of the COVID-19 vaccination programme. The Court rejected those arguments, holding that neither the alleged unreasonableness of the opinion nor assertions of political hostility were capable of showing that Mr Hancock did not genuinely believe what he said. While motive may be relevant in some cases, hostility alone is not enough to show dishonesty.

Defamation claims: How we can help

Negative statements can spread quickly and cause significant reputational damage, particularly where allegations are shared on social media or repeated by the press. As Bridgen v Hancock demonstrates, whether a statement amounts to an honest opinion can be critical.

We have extensive experience in supporting individuals and businesses in responding to harmful publications and protecting their reputation. From early strategic advice through to formal disputes and litigation, we help clients take swift and proportionate action to protect their interests.