Real Estate Matters – Autumn 2017
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Who is responsible for asbestos in non-domestic premises?
What is asbestos? Asbestos is the name given to a group of fibrous materials that […]
What is asbestos?
Asbestos is the name given to a group of fibrous materials that have historically been used in a wide range of building materials as a result of the protection that they can provide against heat, fire and sound. However, asbestos is now recognised as one of the most significant health hazards in the world, reportedly still killing around 5000 workers each year.
Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012
The Control of Asbestos Regulations (CAR 2012) were implemented to take account of the EU Commission’s view that the UK was not fully compliant with the relevant EU directive. CAR 2012 cover a wide range of areas, including who is responsible for controlling asbestos and what they must do to comply. CAR 2012 regulation 4(3) imposes a duty on every ‘dutyholder’ to:
- Determine whether asbestos is present in a building or is likely to be present; and
- Manage any asbestos that is or is likely to be present.
Regulation 4(1) defines a ‘dutyholder’ as ‘every person who has an obligation of any extent in relation to the maintenance or repair of non-domestic premises or any means of access or egress to or from those premises’. This is a very broad definition and means that a variety of individuals could be liable including owners, landlords and tenants of non-domestic properties.
So, is the landlord or the tenant the dutyholder?
In most leases for non-domestic premises the landlord passes primary responsibility for maintenance and repair to the tenant through various clauses within the lease. In such cases the tenant would generally be the dutyholder for the premises for the purposes of CAR 2012.
However, whilst the landlord may have passed primary responsibility for maintenance and repair to the tenant, the landlord usually retains an obligation to maintain and repair common parts or the external parts/structure. In those circumstances, the landlord will also be a dutyholder. Regulation 4(1) CAR 2012 states that where there is more than one dutyholder ‘the relative contributions to be made by each in complying with the regulation 4 duties are determined by the ‘nature and extent of the maintenance and repair obligation’ owed by each dutyholder’.
In short, each party’s liability under CAR 2012 depends on their respective lease obligations to maintain and repair.
Practically, where the lease imposes maintenance and repair obligations on the tenant, the landlord should ensure that the tenant is aware of its potential liability under CAR 2012 and be satisfied that the tenant has complied with its obligations.
Where the property is a multi-let premises and the responsibility for maintenance of the common parts, services, external fabric and main structure lies with the landlord, it will be the sole dutyholder in respect of those areas and will need to fully comply with CAR 2012. However, the landlord may be able to recover its costs of compliance from the tenants via the service charge.
Tenant default and forfeiture
Landlords should be aware that, as the definition of dutyholder is so wide, where primary responsibility has been passed to a tenant but the tenant defaults on any of its duties under CAR 2012, the landlord will need to step in and carry out any necessary works. The inclusion in a lease of a general obligation on the tenant to comply with the statute clause also means that, whilst the landlord may continue to be a dutyholder and may still need to step in and carry out works, the landlord will be able to claim damages from the tenant. Damages can include the costs of carrying out any necessary works, and potentially any other loss the landlord incurs as a result of the tenant’s default.
It is also important to note that, where a lease is forfeited or surrendered, or upon any lease expiry, the landlord will immediately become the primary dutyholder.
Consequences of non-compliance with CAR 2012
As well as potential civil liability [1], failure to comply with CAR 2012 constitutes a criminal offence, for which the penalty for each offence can be a prison sentence of up to 2 years and/or an unlimited fine and CAR 2012 are enforced strictly by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). In 2011 Marks and Spencer were fined £1 million for offences relating to asbestos in two of its stores. Whilst this doesn’t relate to a landlord/tenant situation (but rather an employer/employee situation), it shows the level of fines the HSE is willing to impose.
WM Comment
It will almost always be the case that both the landlord and the tenant of non-domestic premises will be dutyholders for the purposes of CAR 2012. It is therefore essential for parties to consider their respective contributions to maintenance, repair and general compliance with laws when entering into a lease. The Walker Morris transactional Real Estate team has a great deal of experience and can assist you in negotiating and drafting a lease that is appropriate for you (whether as a landlord or a tenant) under CAR 2012, as well as advising on any existing leasehold duties.
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[1] Those affected by a dutyholder’s failure to comply with CAR 2012 may bring a civil suit in negligence (section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013).

‘Garden’ villages and towns to help grow country’s housing stock
Three new ‘garden’ towns and fourteen villages are to be built as part of the […]
Three new ‘garden’ towns and fourteen villages are to be built as part of the Government’s ongoing attempts to alleviate the housing crisis. Almost 50,000 new homes will be created in the villages, alongside approximately 150,000 new dwellings in the towns. In addition, the Government has now launched its consultation on ways to provide “the right homes in the right places”, following-up on the Housing White Paper of February 2017. Richard Sagar of Walker Morris’ Planning & Environment team considers what may lie ahead.
What is involved?
Three new ‘garden’ towns and fourteen villages are to be built as part of the Government’s ongoing attempts to alleviate the housing crisis. Almost 50,000 new homes will be created in the villages, alongside approximately 150,000 new dwellings in the towns.
Funding is to be provided to support delivery, comprising £6 million for the villages and £1.4 million for the towns over the next two years. Local communities will bid for a share, with the Government’s press release explaining this money “will be used to unlock the full capacity of sites, providing funding for additional resources and expertise to accelerate development and avoid delays”. In addition, new garden projects may access other infrastructure funding – such as the recent £2.3 billion Housing Infrastructure Fund. This, at least, makes the towns and villages appear more commercially and economically feasible than previous comparable schemes.
Large-scale garden developments are not entirely novel, having a history dating back to the 1890s and attempts to provide alternatives to industrial slums. However, the new villages are arguably the first of their kind. These are smaller in scale, with 1,500-10,000 homes each and built outside existing settlements. Aiming to reduce concerns about urban sprawl and big schemes subsuming existing towns, they will turn small hamlets into larger communities. The villages are to be spread across the country, with locations including Spitalgate Heath (Lincolnshire) and Long Marston (Stratford-on-Avon). The three towns – to be alongside Aylesbury, Taunton and Harlow & Gilston – will be larger and comprise more than 10,000 houses each. Both development-types are to have green spaces, strong transport links, a sense of community and good-quality affordable homes at their heart.
What does this mean in practice?
The Government’s initial announcement regarding these new towns and villages came early in 2017. However, it seems most schemes are still only in their formative stages and no developments have yet been begun. Whether this is due to logistical and administrative delays, concerns regarding adequate infrastructure, viability problems or widespread objections to the schemes is unclear. Certainly, a number of similar schemes were previously halted due to concerns about loss of valuable green-belt land. For instance, in 2016, the Ebbsfleet Garden City project was stalled following local opposition. Housing Minister, Gavin Barwell, has stated: “Locally-led garden towns and villages have enormous potential to deliver the homes that communities need. New communities not only deliver homes, they also bring new jobs and facilities”. Yet when some schemes will create new and distinct settlements in their own right, rather than simply extending existing urban areas, it seems inevitable that green space will be lost. The relevant areas will also need policy protection from other speculative planning applications in the future, to avoid small hamlets becoming overwhelmed. Such developments will probably encounter strong local resistance and difficulties in overcoming planning hurdles.
On the other hand, the schemes offer welcome opportunities for landowners, residential developers and the construction industry – sectors that have experienced some ‘slow-down’ in the aftermath of Brexit. Once created, new communities also have the potential to boost employment opportunities and economic activity.
If interest in garden schemes is high, the Department for Communities & Local Government (DCLG) is expected to make another call for expressions of interest from places with similar proposals later this year or early in 2018.
Housing certainly remains a Government priority. Following publication of the Housing White Paper in February 2017, DCLG has now launched its follow-up consultation seeking views on specific issues and changes to national planning policy. In his introduction to the consultation, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Sajid Javid, states this is all with the intention of “creating a system that is clear and transparent so that every community and local area understands the scale of the housing challenge they face” and “giv[ing] local communities greater control so they can make informed decisions about exactly where much-needed new homes should be built…[and] help to tackle the lack of affordability of housing in this country”.
Commentators agree there is no ‘silver bullet’ to tackle the long-term under-supply and shortage of housing. Whether this ‘garden’ vision can be delivered in practice and help the situation, alongside changes proposed under the Government’s new consultation, will remain to be seen.

Good news for landlords recovering possession of residential premises
Partridge v Gupta provides helpful High Court authority for landlords recovering possession of residential premises. […]
Partridge v Gupta provides helpful High Court authority for landlords recovering possession of residential premises. Karl Anders, Walker Morris’ Housing Management and Litigation Partner, explains.
Recovery of possession and High Court enforcement
Residential landlords have been increasingly resorting to the use of High Court enforcement officers to carry out evictions. The main reason being that, in practice, they act more quickly than County Court Bailiffs who, according to Ministry of Justice figures, take 6 weeks on average to enforce a possession warrant.
A “Writ of Possession” needs to be issued to use the High Court method of enforcement.
The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 83.13 (2) and (8)), provide that the court’s permission is required to issue a Writ of Possession and that such permission will not be granted unless every person in possession of the land has received “such notice of the proceedings as appears to the court sufficient to enable the occupant to apply to the court for any relief to which the occupant may be entitled” [1].
To date [2] there has been some uncertainty as to what constitutes sufficient “notice” for these purposes. However, in the recent case of Partridge v Gupta [3], the High Court has provided helpful guidance for landlords:
High Court guidance
What constitutes sufficient notice pursuant to CPR 83.13 will vary from case to case.
The court simply needs to be satisfied that any occupant knows enough about the possession proceedings to be able to apply for any relief to which he or she may be entitled.
The requisite “notice” does not have to be a formal notice in any particular form, nor even a letter or other communication containing any particular or prescribed information.
Neither service of the notice of application for permission for a Writ of Possession, nor a letter or other communication explaining that the application will be heard on a particular day/time, are required to comply with CPR 83.13 (but either would suffice).
Where the occupant has been fully involved in the possession proceedings, a reminder of the terms of the court order and a request that possession is given up under the order is likely to suffice. If a landlord is in any doubt, it should explain, in the same communication, that it will seek permission for the issue of a Writ if possession is not delivered up by the occupant, and that eviction will follow.
Where an occupant has not been fully involved in the possession proceedings, the landlord should write to them directly (if they are known by name), or should send a letter addressed to ‘the occupant(s)’ (if they are not), to inform of the terms of the possession order and request that possession be given up accordingly (if an order has been made at that stage); and to explain that permission for a Writ will be sought and that eviction will follow by that route if enforcement is necessary.
WM Comment
The comments by the High Court in Partridge v Gupta should help in terms of signposting appropriate steps to be taken to deal with the “notice” requirements under the court rules.
Landlords and their advisers should, of course, provide evidence of their compliance by either exhibiting a copy of the “notice” letter (and/or any other relevant communication) to their Writ of Possession application (this will apply where the application is intended to be made after the possession order has been obtained and also in those instances where permission to issue a Writ is intended to be sought at the initial possession hearing), so that the court can be satisfied that the landlord has complied with CPR 83.13.
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[1] Note that such permission is not required in trespass cases, however: (CPR 83.13 (3).
[2] In particular, since the 2015 High Court case of Secretary of State for Defence v Nicholas [2015] EWHC 4062 (ch)
[3] [2017] EWHC 2110 (QB)

Surrender and secured property: Trap for unwary tenants
As we have explained in a previous briefing, surrender of a lease can happen by […]
As we have explained in a previous briefing, surrender of a lease can happen by operation of law, without any legal documentation or formality. That lack of any requisite formality can lull parties (and sometimes practitioners) into a false sense that they do not need to devote to lease surrenders the same care and consideration that they would any other real estate transaction or termination. That is a dangerous misconception for various reasons, one of which is highlighted in the recent case of Co-Operative Bank v Hayes; Deutsche Bank v Sentrum [1].
Deceptively straightforward surrender
The head tenant, Deutsche Bank, had sublet the premises in question to an undertenant whose obligations were guaranteed by Sentrum. Hayes was the ultimate landlord, whose freehold was charged to Co-Operative Bank. When the parties agreed to surrender both the headlease and the sublease and to release the undertenant’s guarantor, Deutsche Bank’s solicitors failed to check the freehold title. They therefore failed to note the charge, and so did not obtain the chargeholder’s consent to the surrender of the headlease. That meant that the surrender of the headlease (which was conditional upon Co-Operative’s consent) did not take effect [2], whilst the sublease and the guarantee fell away. Deutsche Bank therefore remained ‘on the hook’ pursuant to the headlease for the remainder of the term (a further 6 years), at an annual rent which was rising incrementally to over £2.6 million per year.
Deutsche Bank tried to mitigate its position. It tried to establish that the surrender of the sublease was also invalid, so that it could continue to receive sublease income:
- Deutsche Bank alleged that the deed which purportedly gave effect to both surrenders and to the release of guarantor contained an implied condition precedent that the sublease would only be surrendered if the headlease was also surrendered. Taking into account authorities on the implication of contractual terms [3], the High Court disagreed. It decided that implying such a condition precedent was not necessary to give business efficacy to the deed and could not be said to have been the intention of the parties.
- Deutsche also attempted to claim that the freeholder and undertenant had impliedly made fraudulent representations that the headlease surrender would take effect when in fact they knew it would not. That argument failed as the court found that Deutsche had relied on its own solicitors, and not on the actions or representations of other parties, when entering the deed.
- Finally, Deutsche argued – unsuccessfully – that the deed was void overall due to a mistake as to its legal effect and/or that the guarantor had been unjustly enriched by being released from its obligations.
Practical advice
The Deutsche Bank case gives rise to a number of legal and practical points, which real estate owners, occupiers and advisors should bear in mind in any surrender situation.
- Surrender of a lease can occur automatically by operation of law, without the need for any legal document or formality. (If a party vacates premises and delivers up the keys, therefore, great care should be taken as to the basis on which those keys are accepted. Whilst acceptance of keys in itself and/or on a without prejudice basis may not constitute acceptance of a surrender by operation of law, all the circumstances of a case will be relevant and the risk of inadvertent surrender may remain.)
- Nevertheless, there are legal requirements which must be met before a surrender (whether it is documented or not) can take effect.
- For example, one of the requirements that is necessary in order for a lease to be surrendered by operation of law is that both the landlord and the tenant must unequivocally act in a way that is inconsistent with the continuance of the lease. Like with any other contractual arrangement, there must be an unequivocal offer to surrender, and an unequivocal acceptance of that offer.
- Also as with any other contractual arrangement, terms will not be implied lightly. When deciding whether or not to imply a term, the court will consider the presumed intention of the parties at the time the contract was made. In order for a term to be implied, it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and where the parties have entered into a document, particularly where they have been legally advised, it will be difficult to imply any term(s).
- Another requirement is that, where a landlord’s title is mortgaged, statute and, in most cases, the terms of the mortgage itself require mortgagee’s consent. Tenants (or, where instructed, their solicitors) should therefore always check the landlord’s title and obtain any necessary consents.
- Conversely, the consent of a tenant’s lender is not needed in order for the surrender of a tenant’s lease to be effective. Charges can, however, survive surrenders, so landlords too are best advised to check their tenant’s titles before surrendering, so as to avoid inadvertently becoming encumbered with a mortgaged property once the lease has fallen away.
- Following completion of a surrender, the landlord should ensure that the leasehold title is closed at HM Land Registry and any note of it cleared from its title, not least so as not to hinder or delay any potential future sale of the property.
If you would like any advice or assistance in relation to the surrender or other early termination of any lease arrangement, please do not hesitate to contact David Manda or any member of the Real Estate Litigation team.
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[1] [2017] EWHC 1820 (Ch)
[2] Where a landlord’s interest is charged, the terms of the mortgage and section 100 of the Law of Property Act 1925 generally provide that the lender’s consent will be required before the landlord can accept a surrender.
[3] In particular, M&S v BNP Paribas [2015] UKSC 72, and see our briefing.

Insecurity of Tenure: High Court ruling threatens commercial tenancy’s statutory right to renewal
In July 2017 the High Court ruled, in S’Franses Ltd v The Cavendish Hotel (London) […]
In July 2017 the High Court ruled, in S’Franses Ltd v The Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd [1], that a landlord’s right to oppose a protected commercial tenant’s statutory right to renew on the grounds that the landlord intends to redevelop the premises remains unfettered even if the motive for the said redevelopment is to evict the tenant and obtain vacant possession. The landlord’s motive in carrying out a redevelopment of the premises was determined to be irrelevant, leaving commercial tenants in prime locations potentially vulnerable to landlords looking to maximise their property’s investment potential and value.
Landlord’s statutory right to oppose a lease renewal
Where a commercial tenant’s lease is protected under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (the 1954 Act), in order to oppose the tenant’s request for a lease renewal, the landlord must establish one of the prescribed statutory grounds for possession. The relevant ground here is section 30(1)(f), which allows a landlord to oppose the grant of a renewal lease on the basis that the landlord intends to redevelop the premises, and it could not reasonably do so without obtaining possession.
The facts of the case
The premises, a prestigious London location, were occupied by the tenant, S’Franses Ltd, for 25 years. The tenant had the benefit of security of tenure and had served a request for a renewal lease under section 26 of the 1954 Act, specifying a commencement date for the new tenancy. The landlord then served a counter notice opposing renewal on the basis of ground (f). The tenant issued court proceedings for the grant of a new tenancy.
The County Court was satisfied that the landlord had satisfied the above test, and so ruled in the landlord’s favour. The tenant appealed to the High Court, submitting that:
- The landlord did not have the requisite intention to develop the premises – it only intended to regain possession of the property. The landlord had not applied for planning permission for the change of use of the property, nor sought the consent of the superior landlord; and
- On this basis, the landlord’s intention was conditional upon termination of the tenancy, and not “firm and settled”, as it should be to satisfy the legal test;
- (Notwithstanding the intention, the landlord could carry out some of the development work with the tenant remaining in situ, utilising the landlord’s current rights under the lease. The lease could be varied to accommodate any further rights required.)
The High Court’s decision
The High Court affirmed that the key consideration is determining what the landlord proposes to do; and whether the landlord intends to do it. Why the landlord is choosing to develop the premises is not relevant. As such, the tenant’s submission as to the landlord’s motive was rejected.
The High Court also rejected the tenant’s proposal to vary the lease, as it considered that this would render the premises substantially unfit for the purposes for which it was let, putting the landlord in breach of the implied covenant not to derogate from grant.
The landlord provided an undertaking to the court to carry out the works within 12 months of the termination of the tenancy. This, together with the landlord’s factual evidence, enabled the High Court to reject the tenant’s application for a new tenancy.
WM Comment
The principles considered in this case are not new and no new law has been created. However the potential loop-holes in the 1954 Act have been brought into focus and the 1954 Act can be vulnerable to sharp practice. Ultimately, the High Court has sent the claim back to County Court for further findings of fact, and we understand that the tenant is planning a further appeal, which may be leapfrogged to the Supreme Court. Walker Morris will monitor and report on any developments.
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[1] [2017] EWHC 1670 (QB)

Planning saga continues for infamous candy-cane house
Background In March 2015, property developer Zipporah Lisle-Mainwaring (ZLW) painted the three-storey façade of her […]
Background
In March 2015, property developer Zipporah Lisle-Mainwaring (ZLW) painted the three-storey façade of her multi-million pound townhouse in red and white ‘candy cane’-style stripes. Prior to this, ZLW had applied to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (the Council) for permission to demolish the terrace property in South End, Kensington, bringing to an end its existing use as a storage space and with the intention of replacing the building with a new home. The development proposals raised numerous objections from neighbours and also failed to gain support from the Council as local planning authority, due to its contravention of their (then, newly-adopted) planning policy restricting basement conversions. Hence it was later alleged that ZLW painted the property merely to spite those opposing the redevelopment plans – although this was strongly denied by ZLW. Following completion of the ‘paint job’, the Council served ZLW with a notice under the Town & Country Planning Act 1990 (the 1990 Act) and required repainting of “all external paintwork located on the front elevation white” within 28 days. And so the saga began….
Planning policy challenge
Following the above, ZLW’s first appearance before the courts occurred in July 2015. ZLW challenged the Council’s policy of restricting basement development to just one storey in depth. Her counsel requested that judges quash the planning policy due to it being “fundamentally flawed”. It was argued that the policy had been adopted without due regard to relevant planning issues and without due consideration as to whether there was “a reasonable alternative”. (The matter reached the court during a period when the extent of subterranean developments was a ‘hot topic’ in the planning world more generally. As detailed in a Walker Morris briefing note at the time, a number of local authorities sought to restrict extensive basement developments due to concerns surrounding disturbance from noise and dust; vibration; possible undermining of building’s structural integrity; displacement of conventional occupiers; and resulting undue distortion of density / square footage.) However, the High Court dismissed ZLW’s case, finding that the Council’s decision to adopt the policy had been reasonable.
Resisting planning enforcement action
During late 2015, ZLW appeared in court again – this time appealing against the Council’s enforcement notice and order that the stripes be painted over. Local planning authorities have the power to use a Section 215 Notice where the condition of land or buildings adversely affects the amenity of an area. The Notice usually requires the owner or occupier of the land to clean-up the site and/or deal with the poor state of a building. In this instance, the Council had issued the Notice stating: “It appears to the Council that the amenity of a part of the area is adversely affected by the condition of the land” and that the stripes were “incongruous with the streetscape of South End and the local area”.
ZLW argued that a Section 215 Notice could only be used to remedy a property’s state of repair, not control the colour or manner in which a property is painted. However, in a decision issued in January 2016, District Judge Susan Bayne ruled that the enforcement notice was “entirely appropriate”. It was stated that painting the property with red and white stripes, in an area where other properties use only a limited and muted pattern of colours, was “garish” and had “an adverse effect on the amenity of the area”. This was particularly in light of the house being located in the Kensington Square Conservation Area, where visual integrity was “fundamental”. The judge dismissed as irrelevant claims that the painting was of no concern to some people, deeming it sufficient that the painting could ‘harm’ those living opposite and any passer-by. ZLW was given 28 days to repaint the property.
The matter was again dismissed by the court in July 2016. HHJ Johnson, sitting at Isleworth Crown Court, accepted the Council’s evidence that the paintwork was “unsightly” and gave considerable weight to the harm that the “garish stripes” caused to the conservation area’s appearance. In addition, the court found that a Section 215 Notice: (1) does not only have to be used where there is a current maintenance issue; and (2) could be used to regulate land’s appearance. While accepting that painting a property is permitted development and does not require any planning permission, this finding of law seemed to usefully clarify the extent of a local authority’s powers under section 215 of the 1990 Act.
Judicial Review
Still being unwilling to repaint the property white, ZLW launched judicial review action at the High Court in London and finally achieved ‘success’. In April 2017, Mr Justice Gilbart ruled in her favour and quashed the Section 215 Notice, stating that whether or not the painting had been done out of pique, eccentricity etc. was irrelevant – “Section 215 does not entitle one to address the motive of a landowner”.
The High Court considered whether a Section 215 Notice could be used in a situation where the complaint is that a painting scheme harms amenity, so that it seeks to rectify a matter of aesthetics as opposed to a lack of maintenance or repair. On this point of law, Gilbart J ruled: “In my judgment, to allow a local planning authority to use section 215 to deal with questions of aesthetics, as opposed to disrepair or dilapidation, falls outside the intention and spirit of the Planning Code”. It was felt that to uphold the Notice would give local authorities power to cause buildings to be repainted, altered or removed simply on the basis of disliking their appearance. It was therefore unlawful to use section 215 of the 1990 Act in any situation where there was no need for maintenance or repair of the land.
Proceeding with the development
Following the Council’s rejection of the application to demolish and redevelop the building, ZLW had been granted permission to convert the building from storage to residential use by the Planning Inspectorate in February 2016. After a series of public inquiries and court hearings, ZLW also won consent to demolish the multi-million pound building entirely and replace it with a brand-new luxury dwelling. The Inspector found:
- that the proposals would “result in a degree of enhancement to the character and appearance of the conservation area”‘;
- no policy objections to the project existed; and
- that the development would bring a material benefit, in terms of providing an additional family home in the area.
The Inspector’s decision has been upheld by the Court of Appeal, whose judgment published in September 2017 found:
- objectors’ suggestions that it was possible for the building to revert to office use – in accordance with local planning policy – would make “no sense, economically or commercially”;
- the Inspector had been entitled to conclude this prospect was just a theoretical one and not possible in reality;
- the development proposals therefore did not conflict with local planning policies; and
- the plans satisfied the prerequisite of being “sustainable development” in accordance with national planning requirements.
The end of the story?
It seems that the landowner’s tenacity has won the day. Having spent a reported £1 million in legal fees, ZLW is now free to proceed with redevelopment of the now infamous ‘candy cane’ striped house – including installing a luxury basement swimming pool as part of the proposal. Presumably her victory tastes ‘sweet’!
However, objectors could still take the matter further. The case has featured on Channel 4’s ‘Posh Neighbours at War’ and one of the main opponents to date has been a businessman and neighbour who was outbid for the property when ZLW purchased it in 2012. Whether or not a subsequent appeal is made to the Supreme Court remains to be seen, and Walker Morris will monitor and report on any key developments.