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Real Estate Matters – August 2015

Real Estate Matters – August 2015

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Forfeiture and Relief: Clarification of court’s discretion

Forfeiture of a lease is available to a landlord as a remedy when a tenant […]

Forfeiture of a lease is available to a landlord as a remedy when a tenant breaches its covenants. As the recent Court of Appeal case of Magnic v Ul-Hassan [1] demonstrates, however, even that is not necessarily the end of the story. A tenant can apply for relief from forfeiture which, if granted, will resurrect the lease and put the parties in the position as if it had never been terminated. Whether or not to grant relief is at the discretion of the court and this case, whilst providing a helpful reminder of the factors which the court may take into account, highlights just how wide that discretion can be.

Background breaches

The claimant was the landlord and the defendants were tenants of commercial premises pursuant to a 125 year lease which held commercial value. The lease contained a tenant covenant to comply with planning law. The tenants obtained a planning permission which allowed them to run a takeaway restaurant from the premises on the condition that they obtained appropriate exterior ducting over an area of the property which exceeded that demised by the lease. The tenants asked the landlord for permission to erect the ducting. Permission was refused and the landlord even obtained a court declaration that the defendants had no right to erect the ducting. Nevertheless, the tenants continued to operate their takeaway business from the premises, in breach of the planning permission and in breach of the lease. The landlord issued court proceedings to forfeit the lease. Those proceedings were resolved by a consent order which granted the tenants relief from forfeiture subject to certain terms. The tenants did not comply with those terms. The landlord then obtained a further court order, this time a possession order with a proviso that if the tenants ceased business by a certain deadline, they would be granted relief from forfeiture. The tenants appealed and, in the meantime, despite the deadline, they continued to trade.

Following the tenants’ breaches of planning permission, lease, consent order and conditional possession order, a district judge and then the County Court dismissed the tenants’ claim for relief and held that the lease was forfeit. Clearly being a party with some nerve, however, the tenants appealed again, this time to the Court of Appeal.

Decision and discretion

The tenants’ appeal was allowed.

Although the Court of Appeal’s decision may be surprising, and indeed it may seem on its face to be unfair, it is a clear example of the fact that the court has a wide discretion whether to grant relief from forfeiture and it is a reminder of the factors that will be taken into account.

The court’s discretion whether to grant relief is wide and the courts have refused to lay down rigid guidelines as to the exercise of that discretion.
As a starting point, however, the tenant should remedy the breach (or pay compensation if the breach cannot be remedied) and the court should be convinced that the tenant will perform its obligations in future.
The court can take into account:

– the tenant’s conduct (including whether the breach was wilful or deliberate)
– the nature and gravity of the breach and its relationship to the value of the property
– the respective advantage to the landlord and disadvantage to the tenant if the lease remains forfeit.

In Magnic, the Court of Appeal accepted the tenants’ case that when it had applied for an appeal it had also obtained a stay of execution which it, mistakenly but genuinely, believed extended the deadline for ceasing to trade. The court did not therefore characterise the tenants’ behaviour which led to this particular hearing as being in wilful or deliberate breach.

The Court of Appeal also found that the lower courts had given insufficient consideration to the respective advantage (or ‘windfall’) to the landlord and disadvantage to the tenant if the lease of valuable commercial premises remained forfeit.

Lord Justice Pattern [2] noted that:

the starting point for the exercise of the court’s discretion should be that the purpose of the right of forfeiture is to provide the landlord with some security for the performance of the tenant’s covenants – it is not intended to operate as an additional penalty for breach; and
in most cases relief will be granted on the breach being remedied and on terms as to costs.

He went on to say that, although the defendants’ conduct will have been a cause for concern for any reasonable landlord, it was not suggested in the case that the breaches of covenant were incapable of being remedied, either by the grant of a further planning permission with suitable conditions for the extraction of fumes, or by the cesser of the takeaway business

WM Comment

The law relating to forfeiture and relief is extremely complex. It is full of intricacies and traps for the unwary and individual cases turn on their own facts. What is clear, however, is that where a landlord wishes to extinguish a lease early by reason of a tenant’s default, it must do so with the utmost caution.

This case reiterates that forfeiture is a remedy which should not be taken lightly. Landlords faced with a tenant in breach should take urgent advice from a specialist Real Estate Litigator because, even in cases where forfeiture will be appropriate, the right to forfeit can be easily and inadvertently lost. There are legal and procedural issues which your advisor will be able to help you to consider and navigate. In the vast majority of cases these will need to be addressed immediately when a breach occurs – before even any demand is sent, or any correspondence (verbal or written) is entered into with the tenant.

Similarly, whilst the Magnic decision may be good news for tenants, it should not be interpreted as giving free rein to flout tenants’ lease obligations. Where relief from forfeiture is granted, it is on legally binding terms as to the remedying of any breach[es], the payment of compensation where appropriate and, generally, costs.

Walker Morris’ Real Estate Litigation team acts for both landlords and tenants. We can help you to protect your assets and your rights, whatever your perspective.

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[1] Magnic Limited v Ul-Hassan and another [2015] EWCA Civ 224
[2] at para. 50

Letter of Lease is King, says Supreme Court

A service charge is a mechanism contained in a lease that allows the landlord to […]

A service charge is a mechanism contained in a lease that allows the landlord to recover its running costs for the building from the tenants. Service charges can be costly and they are therefore often contentious. A particularly stark example of this is the recent Supreme Court case of Arnold v Britton [1]. Housing and Real Estate Litigation specialists Karl Anders and Martin McKeague explain.

A tenant’s service charge liability does not arise at all unless and until the landlord has properly complied with the service charge procedure and calculations set out in the lease. As with any other contractual clause, therefore, the wording of a service charge provision is key. The starting point when a dispute arises is the wording of the clause itself, and the general principle is that the letter of the lease is king.

Arnold v Britton concerned the service charge provisions in 25 holiday chalet leases. In accordance with the ordinary natural meaning of the wording of the relevant clause [2], both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had previously agreed with the landlord that the provisions obliged the tenants to pay a fixed yearly service charge amount which rises at the rate of 10% per annum, irrespective of the cost to the landlord of providing services. This interpretation meant, however, that service charges payable per year would top over £½ million by the end of the lease terms in respect of modest holiday chalets, the use of which is restricted to half of each year only. In light of the disastrous economic consequences of this interpretation, the tenants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and took the opportunity to clarify the correct approach to contractual interpretation.

Correct approach to contractual interpretation

Whilst consideration of commercial common sense can, in the right circumstances, be taken into account, it is not a criterion of contractual interpretation that should undermine the importance of the clear language of a clause.

The starting point is the wording of the [lease] contract itself.
An objective test – that of what the reasonable business person would understand the clause to mean – is applied to ascertain the parties’ intention at the time the contract was entered into.
Commercial common sense can be a consideration, but:

– it cannot be invoked ‘after the fact’ – it is only relevant to ascertaining how matters would or could have been perceived when the contract was made;
– where there are two or more tenable interpretations, the most commercially sensible option will be preferred;
– it is not for the court to depart from clear contractual wording even where that represents a bad bargain for any party.

In relation to service charge provisions specifically, there is no general rule that these should be interpreted restrictively to reflect a tenant’s limited interest in the property. Service charge clauses are to be determined in accordance with general principles of contractual interpretation.

WM Comment

The property industry and commercial litigation commentators alike awaited this decision with interest. The big question was whether commercial efficacy would become enshrined in service charge and other commercial contract clauses. Despite a dissenting judgment [3], the law is now very clear as to the extent to which commercial common sense will influence interpretation.

The question now, therefore, is what you can do if you face an unfavourable outcome in any of your leases or contracts.

Consider carefully the wording in the clause itself. If there is real uncertainty, then commercial common sense can be taken into account and may assist.
Is there any scope for settlement? It is rare for any contractual interpretation dispute to be clear cut. Even if the odds are against you, the chances are that any grey area and inevitable litigation risk can be exploited in negotiations to encourage a commercial compromise.
In any event, it is good to talk. Interpretation disputes often arise by virtue of the fact that there is an ongoing contractual relationship between the parties. It can be in the interests of all concerned for the parties to behave in a reasonable and commercially sensible manner. We understand that, even in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, the landlord in the Arnold v Britton case has informally agreed to renegotiate the service charge provisions in question to index-link the annual increase, as this does represent reasonable modern commercial practice and it may be beneficial to all parties to help tenants to avoid future default.
Even if the wording in the contract is clear on face value, has there been a mistake in the drafting of the contract? Ask whether the clause genuinely reflects the parties’ intentions at the time the contract was entered into. If it does not, take legal advice to investigate the potential to pursue a claim for rectification.
Alternatively, was the clause entered into in reliance on any misrepresentations? If so, the contract could be set aside and financial compensation could be payable.
Finally, consider whether you were properly advised when the lease or contract was completed. It is possible that any losses could be recouped via a professional negligence claim.
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[1] Arnold v Britton &Ors [2015] UKSC 36
[2] The wording of the relevant clause differed very slightly between leases, but a typical example was “To pay to the Lessor without any deduction…a proportionate part of the expenses and outgoings incurred by the Lessor in the… provision of services… the yearly sum of Ninety Pounds and value added tax (if any) for the first year of the term hereby granted increasing thereafter by Ten Pounds per Hundred for every subsequent year or part thereof”.
[3] The decision was a 4:1 majority. Lords Neuberger, Sumption, Hughes and Hodge concurred with the dismissal of the appeal. In his dissenting judgment, Lord Carnworth considered that there was an inherent ambiguity between the clause’s purpose to enable the landlord to recover a “proportionate” part of expenses incurred and its quantification calculation. That ambiguity would have given rise to him adopting commercial common sense as a reason to allow the appeal.

Shedding some light on solar panels

The use of solar panels has increased dramatically in the past few years and by […]

The use of solar panels has increased dramatically in the past few years and by the end of 2014 had almost doubled compared to 2013 [1]. This increase has been fuelled by the falling cost of purchasing and installing panels, government subsidies and the desire of companies and householders to be more environmentally-friendly.

But as take up of solar panel technology has increased householders and businesses are now considering whether their investment in solar technology could be at risk if light to the panels is blocked by a new building or even large trees on neighbouring land.

In short the answer is yes; a neighbouring landowner has the right to build on or to alter existing buildings on his land and unless the land on which the panels are situated takes the benefit of a right to light it does not matter if the light to those panels is blocked.

Can a landowner have a right to light for solar panels?

As with other rights, a right to light can be acquired by express grant or by a prescriptive right arising from 20 or more years of use.

The Law Commission carried out a review of rights to light in December 2014 [2] (the Law Commission Report). Its preferred method of protecting solar panel rights to light was for the landowner to enter into restrictive covenants with neighbouring landowners, who would agree to bind their land with the intention of preventing disputes down the line. In practice, however, it can be very difficult for a landowner to get neighbouring landowners to agree to grant a right to light. They may simply refuse outright, not wanting to hinder possible future development of their property, or require a payment for consent making the initial investment no longer viable.

At present there is no direct case law on whether a solar panel can gain a prescriptive right to light after 20 years’ long use. In the recent case of Coventry v Lawrence [3] the Supreme Court held that the noise emitted from a motorcycle race track over neighbouring land established an easement after 20 years’ long use even though the noise was intermittent, suggesting that the intermittency of light might not be a hindrance to obtaining a right.

In Allen and Another v Greenwood and Another [4] the court held that a prescriptive right to light could be acquired by a greenhouse after more than 20 years. Usually the court bases its decision on the level of light required to, for example, illuminate a room which could be vastly different to the amount required for the efficient working of a solar panel. In this case the court gave consideration to the benefits of sunlight required for the purpose of growing plants. However Lord Justice Goff stated that in a case involving solar heating it might be possible to separate out different properties of sunlight, such as its heat from its light and to reach a different judgment.

The Law Commission Report concluded that in its opinion solar panels could not benefit from a prescriptive right to light. Whilst acknowledging that this has not yet been tested in the courts the Law Commission concluded that an aperture in a building is required through which the light is “channelled” into that building. This limits the benefit of light easements to not blocking a particular light channel. A solar panel is a different proposition as it does not have an aperture; it can receive light from all angles so any easement would have to be given in the broadest terms. A large expenditure of time and effort would be required by the parties to a dispute to determine all the possible channels of light. The Law Commission also pointed out that it would be difficult to determine the extent of the easement given that the purpose of the right would be for the landowner to harvest solar energy rather than to illuminate a room.

It is interesting to note that in the responses to the Law Commissions consultation those who mentioned solar panels were unanimously in favour of greater protection of the right to light, arguing that the legal position should be changed to encourage the use of renewable energy sources not hinder it.

In conclusion

A landowner who is considering installing solar panels should give due consideration to the risk that unless neighbouring landowners will agree to grant a right to light it may well have no protection should its neighbours block access to light. It is unlikely that a prescriptive right will be granted, but even if the courts do find a prescriptive right arises the requirement for 20 years use is of little help to the growing number of people purchasing solar panels now.

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[1] http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/29/solar-power-in-the-uk-almost-doubled-in-2014
[2] Law Commission Report: Rights to Light (2014) Law Comm No 356
[3] [2014] UKSC13
[4] [1980] Ch. 119

The Battle of the Basements

As part of the Summer 2015 Budget and accompanying report (‘Fixing the Foundations: Creating a […]

As part of the Summer 2015 Budget and accompanying report (‘Fixing the Foundations: Creating a More Prosperous Nation’), George Osborne announced that planning permission would no longer be required for upwards extensions of a limited number of storeys in London. This is provided the extension serves to bring a building to the same height as adjoining properties. But what is the future for development in the opposite direction for basement extensions? How far can underground development be pursued without an application for permission? Richard Sagar of Walker Morris’ Planning & Environment team considers the legislation surrounding basement development and the recent ruling in Kensington & Chelsea Royal Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.

The story so far

With ever-increasing residential property prices in the capital, recent years have seen a substantial rise in the number of basement developments – as homeowners either create new, or enlarge existing, underground space beneath properties. In 2001, there were only 46 applications to ‘dig down’ made to the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (RBKC). By 2013 this figure had risen to approximately 450. This has generated controversy and concerns. Basements raise issues of noise and disturbance during construction; potential physical and structural damage to neighbouring sites; traffic management; sustainable drainage; carbon emissions; the impact on conservation areas and / or listed buildings; and displacement of ‘traditional’ occupiers from the property market post-construction.

Notable examples of basement development amongst the rich and famous abound. Leonard Blavatnik, reputedly the second richest man in the country, has added a garage, swimming pool, gym and cinema to the space under his three former embassy buildings on Kensington Palace Gardens. A few houses away, permission was granted for an underground tennis court, pool, gym and museum space for a classic-car collection. One South Kensington property has obtained consent for a downward extension to allow creation of a 50-foot pool, gym, cinema and beauty spa.

What does the law say?

The legality of these developments has been somewhat unclear. The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 1995 (the 1995 Order) made no specific provision as to whether or not permitted development rights existed for such works. Similarly no indication has been given in its successor legislation, the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the 2015 Order). A number of local planning authorities (LPAs) have regarded basement alterations as falling under Class A works – that is, as permitted development for “the enlargement, improvement or other alteration of a dwellinghouse” and for which a traditional planning application is not required. However, this permitted development right is expressly excluded in both the 1995 Order and 2015 Order where “the enlarged part of the dwellinghouse would have more than one storey and…be within seven metres of any boundary of the curtilage of the dwellinghouse opposite the rear wall of the dwellinghouse”.

Permitted development rights examined

The recent case of Kensington & Chelsea Royal Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (17 June 2015, as yet untranscribed) has provided some clarity on the Class A permitted development rights. In this case, in two appeal decisions, the Planning Inspectorate had granted lawful development certificates for single-storey basement developments to existing dwellings at Princes Gate Mews and Colbeck Mews. Despite the additions not extending beyond the existing dwellings’ perimeter, the LPA had objected on the basis of the restrictions in the 1995 Order (noted above). The LPA and Secretary of State (SoS) agreed that the Class A rights apply to both above-ground and below-ground development. However, the main questions before the court were:

whether the “enlarged part” of the dwellinghouse is simply the single-storey basement as argued by the SoS, or if it includes existing storeys in the dwellinghouse as the LPA suggested; and
whether the seven-metre restriction was to be measured to the dwellinghouse being developed from any dwellinghouse opposite that, or from the dwellinghouse being developed.

Ultimately, the measurement point was conceded by the SoS. It is therefore now established that the seven-metre restriction is measured from the dwellinghouse being extended. In turn, Patterson J ruled that the “enlarged part” of the dwellinghouse refers solely to the development being added via permitted development rights. So, in this instance, the development only had one storey.

What does this mean in reality?

This is welcome news for those wishing to develop under existing dwellings, indicating that the addition of a single storey falls under permitted development rights provided it complies with the relevant criteria.

However, caution is still required. Where any instance of basement development is concerned, the detail of the proposal is important. It must clearly be within the scope of what is permitted under the Class A rights, otherwise a planning application will usually be required. It is also vital to check relevant local planning policy and note if there are specific restrictions.

What does policy say?

The National Planning Practice Guidance does not provide any specific reference to or assistance for subterranean proposals. Some LPAs have introduced policy restrictions specifically to limit the creation of vertical ‘palaces’. RBKC and Westminster City Council are notable examples. The ability for LPAs to lawfully limit the carrying-out of basement developments via blanket policy has very recently been the subject of a legal challenge in the High Court. However in a judgment issued on 23 July 2015, the Court confirmed RBKC’s adoption of its basement policy (Core Strategy Policy CL7) was lawful. Responding to the decision, Councillor Timothy Coleridge stated: “Our policy brings some much-needed sanity to the mega-basement mania and finds the proper balance between subterranean development and the right of the rest of the community to the peaceful enjoying of their homes”.

In the Policy, RBKC set clear limits to underground developments falling under the normal planning regime. Noting that “a basement development…has an immediacy which can have a serious impact on the quality of life”, Policy CL7 restricts basement excavations as follows:

extent – to no more than under half the garden or open part of the site, measured as gross external area; and
depth – to a single storey in most cases, with three to four metres floor-to-ceiling height as a guide.

Larger sites and, generally, new developments will be allowed basement works beyond the restrictions. No further subterranean floors can be added:

where there is an extant or implemented planning permission for a basement; or
where there is one already built as a result of permitted development rights having previously been exercised.

Policy CL7 also outlines specific considerations applicants must address during the preliminary development / application stages, as detailed in RBKC’s Basements Supplementary Planning Document. For example, a draft construction traffic management plan must be submitted with any permission application.

RBKC also intends to impose an Article 4 Direction throughout the borough from 28 April 2016. Directions under Article 4 of the 1995 Order are traditionally used relatively rarely and usually on a restricted scale, rather than borough-wide. However, the Direction will have the effect of removing the existing permitted development rights for basement works altogether. Jonathan Wade, RBKC’s Head of Forward Planning, states that the objective is to “ensure consistency and fairness” and “cut down on neighbours’ concerns about basement developments”. All homeowners will have to obtain full permission for underground proposals and notify neighbours of their plans. Whether any LPA has adequate resources to deal with the increased number of applications likely to result, in a timely and consistent way, is just one of the many concerns this approach raises for owners and developers.

The future

It seems likely that developers and homeowners will need to consider ever-more inventive ways to extend properties, particularly in the capital where floorspace is limited. The changes introduced in the Summer 2015 Budget will be of some assistance here.

Lateral development is increasingly popular. Chris Martin and Gwyneth Paltrow purchased a semi-detached house in Belsize Park for £2.5 million, before obtaining the adjoining property for a reputed £3 million in 2010. After combing the two properties and undertaking some basement excavation, they created a 33-room mansion, joined two gardens and created space for a swimming pool. Roman Abramovich combined nine flats in one block in Lowndes Square, although this was sold before the work was completed. Whether this will be another area in which LPAs introduce restrictions before long remains to be seen. RBKC previously allowed merging of up to four planning units, but since September 2014 all such amalgamations require consent. The policy is apparently to be tightened during the course of 2015.

Vertical and horizontal development remains a viable and effective way for homeowners and developers to expand property, adapting it to their needs and requirements. While the days of ‘iceberg homes’ may be numbered in certain areas, the battle of the basements looks likely to rumble on.

For further information or advice on permitted development rights and the impact of recent decisions, contact the Planning & Environment team at Walker Morris LLP.

The end of forfeiture?

It is fair to say that reformation of the law of forfeiture has been a […]

It is fair to say that reformation of the law of forfeiture has been a topic of discussion for many years; the Law Commission opened a consultation on the subject in 2004 and in 2006 published a report proposing that the current law be abolished and replaced by an entirely new statutory scheme dealing with the termination of leases following tenant default. The Law Commission’s view is that the current law is overly complex and can lead to injustice and is therefore in need of simplification and modernisation. In March 2015 the Lord Chancellor’s report on the implementation of the Law Commission’s proposals noted that the proposals were still awaiting a government decision and confirmed that it is intended that a conclusion on the subject should be reached during 2015. As such, it is possible that a further step towards reforming this contentious area of law may soon be taken.

Forfeiture: the current law in brief

In circumstances where a tenant has defaulted on its obligations under a lease, forfeiture enables the landlord to terminate the tenancy. Under the current law, forfeiture can take place either by a landlord issuing and serving possession proceedings or by them taking some other unequivocal action, for example, changing the locks, to demonstrate the termination of the tenancy (known as peaceable re-entry). If a tenancy is forfeited by either method, the tenant (or a sub-tenant or mortgagee) may apply to the court for relief from forfeiture which would have the effect of reinstating the tenancy.

The new proposals

The Law Commission have proposed that forfeiture be entirely abolished and replaced by a new statutory scheme which would provide for two forms of termination. The first, standard procedure would be court based and would sit along side a second, accelerated summary process which would replace peaceable re-entry. The new statutory scheme would apply to all tenancies, regardless of whether they were entered into before or after the scheme comes into force or whether or not the lease contains a forfeiture clause.

To utilise the standard procedure the landlord would be required to serve a ‘tenant default notice’ within six months of breach and not less than seven days before the termination claim. The default notice would need to specify what action should be taken by the tenant to remedy the breach and the time frame for that action. The notice would need to be served on not only the tenant, but also the holders of all derivative interests. If the tenant failed to remedy the breach the landlord could then commence action in the court. In circumstances where the court is content that a breach has occurred then it has the ability to make a number of different orders, including that the tenancy be terminated (albeit the order may be one requiring the tenant to remedy the breach).

The second procedure proposed by the Law Commission would permit a landlord to bring the tenancy to an end without the need to apply to court. As with the standard procedure, to utilise the summary procedure, the landlord must first serve a notice, in this case a ‘summary termination notice’. Again the notice must be served on the tenant and any subtenants, mortgagees, etc. The notice will bring the tenancy to an end one month from the date of service unless the tenant (or the holder of a derivative interest) applies to the court for a discharge of the notice. In the absence of an application to discharge the notice the landlord may regain possession of the property by, for example, changing the locks. If, however, an application is made to discharge the notice, the tenancy will only determine if the application is refused at which point the court may order that possession be given to the landlord. A landlord will only succeed against a tenant in a discharge application if they can prove that the tenant would, in standard termination proceedings, have no realistic prospect of avoiding a termination order being made by the court. If the commence the standard procedure in order to bring the tenancy to an end. Whilst the holder of derivative interest may no longer apply for relief they could apply to court for a post-termination order within six months of summary termination.

A happy ending?

Whilst the proposal for replacement of forfeiture by court action has generally been favourably accepted, the abolition of peaceable re-entry has caused controversy. Peaceable re-entry is generally seen as an effective remedy and the proposed summary termination procedure has a number of perceived issues which mean that the industry does not necessarily consider it a suitable alternative. It is not clear how a landlord could be aware that a tenant has made an application for a discharge order. It may take a considerable time for the court to process the application and serve it on the landlord thus turning a self-help remedy into one governed by the courts. This issue could be solved by a requirement for the tenant to serve notice on the landlord that an application has been made to the court. The summary procedure also gives tenants scope to occupy properties rent free whilst proceedings are brought in the court. Under the current regime where a landlord re-enters a property for failure to pay the rent the landlord will often let the tenant back into occupation pending a court hearing (as otherwise the tenant could make an application to court for an injunction). This means that currently the tenant will either have to agree to, or be required to, pay money on account of the rent while its application for relief is heard. Using the new procedure however the tenant could make an application for a discharge order regardless of whether it has any realistic prospect of termination being avoided. The tenant could therefore continue to trade from the premises even where there is no real prospect of it successfully contesting proceedings in court. This issue could be avoided if there was a requirement for tenants to pay sums due under the lease as a requirement of making an application for a discharge order.

The future

It is considered that the fact that modification of the law on forfeiture have been discussed for so long means that change is now inevitable. The current proposals however are not without their own issues and the summary procedure is considered to be particularly problematic. It is therefore hoped that the current review will be used by the government as an opportunity to iron out some of the issues so as to make the process more satisfactory.

Contacts

Austin Judson
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Jeremy Moore
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Judith Pike
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Karl Anders - Partner, Housing Litigation & Management Team at Walker Morris LLP.

Karl Anders
Partner
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Martin McKeague - Partner, Real Estate Litigation at Walker Morris LLP.

Martin McKeague
Partner
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