Home
Publications
Mutual Matters – January 2017

Mutual Matters – January 2017

Print newsletter

Legal advice privilege: Advice for mutuals

Legal advice privilege is a hugely valuable legal right. The High Court has revisited legal […]

Legal advice privilege is a hugely valuable legal right. The High Court has revisited legal advice privilege and has reiterated its narrow scope. This important decision is essential reading for any mutual involved in a dispute or in any regulatory or internal investigation. Walker Morris Partner Louise Power, a specialist in retail financial services litigation and non-executive director of a local building society, explains privilege and offers her practical advice.

Important protection

Privilege is a vital legal protection for mutuals, but it is a concept whose rules are complex and often confusing. Privilege entitles a party to withhold documents (including electronic communications) from a court or third party, without any adverse inferences being drawn. A proper understanding of the operation of privilege in litigation and regulatory investigations can therefore help clients and their lawyers to obtain advice and information without risk of exposing or compromising their position. A lack of understanding, however, can potentially prove fatal to a case.

There are important public policy justifications underpinning privilege, such as the need for clients to be able to candidly disclose matters to their lawyers; to enable lawyers to obtain, investigate, record and freely communicate to their clients information so that clients can make fully informed decisions; and, in the context of regulatory investigations, so that regulators can deal with experienced lawyers who can accurately advise their clients how to respond and cooperate, which in turn will advance public interest.

Privilege has hit the legal headlines a lot recently, and in uncertain and increasingly regulated times, it is essential that financial services clients understand and apply this important right and safeguard.

Types of privilege

There are various different forms of privilege, including: litigation privilege, which arises where a document or communication has been created for the dominant purpose of existing or pending litigation; without prejudice privilege, which enables parties to conduct settlement negotiations without fear of prejudice in subsequent court proceedings; and common interest privilege, which can arise where a document is disclosed to a third party who has a common interest in the subject matter.

Another key form of legal professional privilege, and the subject of this article, is legal advice privilege.

The following essential factors must exist for legal advice privilege to apply:

The document or communication in question must be confidential. Any document that has been too widely disseminated or has been made public (for example has been posted online) cannot attract privilege protection;
The document must pass between a qualified lawyer and his or her client.
The document must have been created for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice in the relevant legal context. Today, a commercial lawyer’s role often extends beyond advising on black letter law and privilege will not arise where a lawyer advises on purely business or administrative matters. To determine whether there is the requisite relevant legal context, the court will ask whether the lawyer’s involvement relates to the rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of the client either under private law or under public law and whether a policy justification for legal advice privilege applies in the particular case. Finally;
Privilege must not have been lost or waived, even inadvertently.

The second of these factors has given rise to some real controversy in the courts, and is the focus of a recent High Court case.

Who is the ‘client’?

Following the Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision in the well-known Three Rivers (No. 5) [1] case, ‘client’, in this context, is very narrowly defined and will only cover those members of an organisation who are actually charged with instructing lawyers.

In the Three Rivers litigation, creditors of Bank of Credit and Commerce International sued the Bank of England for misfeasance in public office. A special inquiry unit, comprised of just three employees of the bank, was given responsibility for coordinating and communicating with the bank’s lawyers. The Court of Appeal held that the ‘client’ was limited to members of that unit. The reasoning was that it is in the public interest that courts should, wherever possible, come to judgments based on all relevant material and so legal advice privilege, which precludes disclosure to the court, should not extend beyond the confines properly necessary to facilitate the lawyer-client relationship.

That decision has led to much criticism, from both an academic and a practical perspective, because of difficulties that it provides for large corporates and institutions. Information that a lawyer needs to gather in any given case or investigation might have to be compiled from various different employees across the business. Those employees may or may not fit within this very narrow definition of the ‘client’ and the risk that communications will not be privileged if they do not can severely hamper the investigation process. The Three Rivers (No. 5) approach has therefore been rejected in other common law jurisdictions, including Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong.

It has, however, been applied, and firmly reiterated, in a recent decision of the High Court of England and Wales, as part of the ongoing RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2].

Narrow application

In this case Mr Justice Hildyard acknowledged that there was some force in criticism of the Three Rivers (No. 5) approach and even noted that the Supreme Court may need to revisit the law of legal advice privilege. He did, however, consider that Three Rivers (No. 5) was binding on him and he concluded that the law clearly remains that:

the client for the purposes of privilege consists only of those employees authorised to seek and receive legal advice from the lawyer.

What about interview working papers?

In anticipation of the court finding that employees and ex-employees interviewed by its lawyer [3] did not fall within the narrow definition of ‘client’, RBS alternatively argued that the lawyer’s notes of those interviews were nevertheless privileged as they formed part of the lawyer’s working papers.

There was no dispute that a verbatim transcript of an unprivileged interview would not be privileged, nor that privilege protection would apply if the notes of the interview could indicate the content or direction of legal advice being given.

Concluding, however, that there is a significant difference between interview notes merely reflecting the note-takers’ line of enquiry or perception of particular points of interest, and them giving a clue as to legal advice, the High Court confirmed that:

legal advice privilege does not extend to information provided by employees or ex-employees simply because it is provided to a lawyer.

Practical matters

This is an important, if unwelcome, decision for organisations involved in a dispute or regulatory or internal investigation. It is a restatement of the law as per Three Rivers (No. 5) and it even extends the principle that legal advice privilege has a narrow ambit, by virtue of the judge’s confirmation that information given by [ex-]employees in an interview may not be privileged simply by virtue of it being provided to a lawyer or recorded in lawyer’s notes.

So what can financial services clients do?

At the outset of any investigation (internal or regulatory) or any dispute, consider carefully the advisors who will be retained and the ‘client’ (i.e. the person or persons within the client-organisation) who will be charged with instructing advisors.
- Privilege will only attach to documents and communications passing between a client and a qualified lawyer. Privilege will not arise when advice – even advice on legal matters – is taken from any other professional.
- If too many people within an organisation are charged with instructing lawyers that could undermine any claim to privilege. It could also cause practical, case management difficulties if there are no clear reporting lines for the giving and receiving of instructions, documents and legal advice. It could also risk confidentiality breaches, which could, again, undermine privilege.
- However, if too few people are authorised to instruct lawyers, that could cause practical difficulties if, for example, the key client contact(s) was/were absent, uncontactable, or perhaps left the business.
- In line with one of the key underlying justifications for privilege, consider appointing specialist legal advisors to assist with any investigations and/or litigation. Appointing external lawyers can have the dual benefit of providing specialist expertise and strengthening any claim to privilege.
There may be circumstances in which dissemination of information, documents and/or advice relating to an investigation is necessary with an organisation beyond the defined ‘client’ circle. Where that cannot be avoided, the communication/document should be endorsed with wording which confirms that it is privileged and that provision of it does not amount to a waiver of privilege. Confirmation should also be obtained from the recipient(s) that the document will be held in confidence and not distributed any further.
Where it proves essential for a privileged document to be disclosed to any third party, the third party should be asked to enter into a common interest privilege agreement, or to give an undertaking to ensure that the document will be held in confidence and to prevent waiver of privilege.
Non-lawyer employees, experts or advisors should not conduct the information-gathering, interviewing and/or reporting process in any investigation or [potential] litigation. It is possible, even likely, that any documents created by non-lawyers will be disclosable unless the fairly stringent requirements for litigation privilege can be met.
To maximise protection, any reports, transcripts, minutes or other documents created by lawyers for clients should ideally interweave legal analysis and advice along with factual matters and they should be headed “privileged and confidential”.
Finally, an important point to note is that you cannot make a document or communication privileged simply by saying it – whether or not privilege applies will, in each case, be a matter of fact and law. If you are in any doubt, always seek specialist legal advice.

Further development?

RBS might well appeal this decision, in which case the law relating to legal advice privilege could be subject to further development soon. Walker Morris will monitor closely and report on any developments.

In the meantime, if you are faced with an investigation or any potential or ongoing dispute and wish to protect your important right of privilege, please do not hesitate to contact Louise Power or any member of the Financial Services team.

_____________________

[1] Three Rivers District Council & Ors v Governor & Co of the Bank of England [2003] EWCA Civ 474
[2] A number of institutional investors are suing the bank for losses sustained after they invested in a rights issue in reliance upon an RBS prospectus which allegedly portrayed the bank’s financial health and stability in a more favourable light than was really the case. The judgement which is the subject of this briefing has citation [2016] EWHC 3161 (Ch)
[3] as part of the business’ internal investigations

FCA market study: Competition in the mortgage sector

On 12 December 2016, following a Call for Inputs seeking stakeholder’s views on how well […]

On 12 December 2016, following a Call for Inputs seeking stakeholder’s views on how well competition is working for the benefit of consumers in the mortgage sector, the FCA launched a market study which will focus on:

whether the available tools and advice at each stage of the consumer journey help mortgage customers to make effective decisions;
whether commercial arrangements between lenders, brokers and other players lead to conflicts of interest or misaligned incentives to the detriment of consumers; and
whether there are opportunities for better technology and increased digitisation to provide solutions to problems identified by the FCA, including the delivery of information and advice.

The FCA aims to publish an interim report in summer 2017 and will provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment prior to publishing a final report in 2018.

For further information on the FCA’s market study and what this will mean for mutuals, please see our more detailed briefing. Walker Morris will continue to monitor and report on developments, but please do not hesitate to contact us in the meantime if you have any queries.

Beware imperfect recollection – evidence of normal practice might not be enough

“I would have done what I always do” is an incredibly common statement when it […]

“I would have done what I always do” is an incredibly common statement when it comes to adducing evidence in lender cases, but Walker Morris Banking Litigation expert advises mutuals as to why witnesses should beware reliance on imperfect recollection.

Within the retail lending market, the urgency and pressure of customer deadlines and commercial targets for mortgage approvals, along with the sheer volume of cases dealt with by individual underwriters, mortgage valuation surveyors and intermediaries, as well as the process-driven nature of the work, can, quite understandably, mean that one case very much runs into another. Specific details about any one particular case can therefore become indistinguishable or even lost altogether, and that can cause difficulties when it comes to giving evidence later down the line. That is especially so if, as often happens, a dispute arises some years after the event.

In such cases it is very common practice for a witness to give evidence as to his or her normal practice (as to, say, underwriting procedures or mortgage valuation techniques), and therefore to ask the court to accept that the witness would have acted in accordance with that normal practice in the case in question.

A recent spate of cases [1], however, has highlighted that that is actually a risky strategy to adopt. In fact, over recent months there have been several decisions which have emphasised that, regardless of the overall honesty and credibility of a witness; and regardless how reasonable in the circumstances of the case [2] it may have been for an individual witness not to specifically notice or record particular events or details, evidence of normal practice might well be legitimately rejected by the court. Similarly, a judge may reject a ‘statistical’ or ‘probability’ approach to establishing what actually happened in any given case where a witness’ recollection may not be absolute. Instead, in all cases, the court will examine available evidence – in particular documentary evidence – first. Mutuals and other lender should note that witnesses’ imperfect recollection and/or evidence or normal practice will only be considered thereafter and will be weighed in the balance.

WM Comment

While it may seem ironic to recommend incurring further time [implementing and] complying with an additional administrative step in the retail lender’s/valuer’s process, the best way for mutuals and individual employees and professionals to protect themselves is to keep a detailed, written or digital record of every communication and decision undertaken in every single case.

The old saying goes ‘a stitch in time saves time’ and the concept rings true in this context. In an ideal world, if mutuals and their representatives can routinely take the time to consider and record the detail of all their dealings, the benefits can be several-fold: mistakes, delays and customer complaints are less likely to arise in the first place; and if and when they do, reliable recollection and documentary evidence will be readily at hand to support and protect the building society’s position.

_________________

[1] All of which arise in the context of medical negligence claims, but the legal principles of which apply equally in lender cases: [2016] EWHC 121 (QB); [2016 EWHC 251 (QB); [2016] EWHC 269 (QB); [2016] EWHC 330 (QB)
[2] as to which, factors such as workload and time pressure will be relevant

Loss of chance and solicitors’ negligence

Walker Morris has reported previously on the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Wellesley v […]

Walker Morris has reported previously on the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Wellesley v Withers [1]. In that case the court concluded that where concurrent liability in tort and contract exists, a claimant is not entitled to choose whichever test for calculating damages appears to be the most advantageous to its case. Instead, the contractual test will be applied, rather than the arguably wider test applicable to claims in tort.

Court of Appeal case

Concurrent contractual and tortious liability often arises in solicitors’ negligence cases, where a breach of retainer also amounts to a breach of the solicitors’ duty of care. That was the position in the recent case of Wright v Lewis Silkin LLP [2], in which the defendant solicitors failed to advise in relation to jurisdiction when drafting an employment contract between the claimant and its employer, a foreign company.

At first instance the High Court had decided that the solicitors were liable in contract and in tort and ordered them to pay £2 million to the claimant to compensate it for the lost chance to obtain payment from the employer of an English judgment sum. The absence of an exclusive English jurisdiction clause in the employment contract had caused a delay in the claimant obtaining a judgment against the employer and, by the time it came to enforcement, the employer was insolvent and so the judgment sum was not paid.

The Court of Appeal, however, applied Wellesley v Withers, and adopted the more restrictive contractual measure of damages. In so doing, the court found that the claimant’s inability to obtain payment of the judgment sum was not damage that would have been in the contemplation of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant solicitors, as being not unlikely to result from a breach, at the time the employment contract was drafted. As such the £2 million was too remote and not recoverable.

As an aside, although it was not necessary in the context of the judgment overall [3], the Court of Appeal also commented that, in the alternative, it considered that the claimed £2 million loss was outside the solicitors’ duty of care in any event, and would therefore be precluded by the operation of the ‘SAAMCO cap’[4].

Legal and practical implications of interest to mutuals

Wright v Lewis Silkin is an important endorsement of the Wellesley finding that, where concurrent contract and tort liability exists, the tougher contractual test for the calculation of damages will apply. It also confirms, certainly pending further consideration of the question by the Supreme Court, that the SAAMCO principles for limiting professional negligence liability apply to solicitors’, as well as to surveyors’, negligence cases.

Mutuals should be aware that claimants therefore need to ensure that they can establish a sound basis on which a loss of chance claim can be said to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the retainer and the professional duty of care came into effect. Equally, defendants should seek to challenge loss of chance claims wherever there is the possibility that loss claimed is too remote to pass the contractual test.

(In relation to the Supreme Court’s imminent further guidance on the applicability of SAAMCO principles to solicitors’ negligence cases, Walker Morris will monitor and report on developments in due course.)

_______________________

[1] Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP [2015] EWCA Civ 1146
[2] [2016] EWCA Civ 1302
[3] …and because the applicability of SAAMCO principles to solicitors’ negligence cases is currently under consideration by the Supreme Court in another case in any event (i.e. in BPE Solicitors and another v Hughes-Holland (in substitution for Gabriel) – judgment in that case is awaited as at the date of writing)….
[4] In South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1996] UKHL 10 the House of Lords held that surveyors who provide negligent overvaluations are only liable for loss caused by the negligent valuation itself, and not for loss caused by any extraneous factor(s). That proposition has become known as the SAAMCO principle or ‘cap’, and is frequently relied upon to limit negligence liability.

Notification injunctions – a new opportunity?

Where there is any risk of dissipation of assets, claimants ordinarily consider obtaining a freezing […]

Where there is any risk of dissipation of assets, claimants ordinarily consider obtaining a freezing injunction to try to ensure that a [potential] defendant’s assets are ‘frozen’ and remain available pending the enforcement of a court judgment. However, freezing injunctions are widely recognised as an highly invasive, draconian remedy, which place significant restrictions and inconvenience on defendants, and which demand high evidential burdens and upfront financial risk of claimants. (For further information on the legal and practical issues surrounding freezing injunctions, please see our more detailed briefing.) As such, freezing orders are not granted lightly by the courts.

Mutuals take note – A new option for claimants

In 2016 the High Court provided rare authority [1] on a genuine alternative to the freezing order: the notification injunction.

This remedy represents something of a ‘middle ground’ in that it does not go so far as to freeze the [potential] defendant’s assets, but it does require the defendant to notify the claimant prior to disposing of any assets over a certain value. The notification injunction is significantly less intrusive upon the defendant, yet it provides a certain level of comfort for the claimant – including a framework within which the claimant would be given the opportunity to apply for a freezing order if and when the defendant actually sought to dissipate assets to avoid enforcement.

In Holyoake the High Court decided that section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides authority for a court to grant a notification injunction, but that the court’s discretion to do so is not entirely unfettered. A claimant cannot obtain an order which requires a defendant to disclose assets and notify as to what he or she intends to do with those assets simply because the claimant is interested in that information. As with a freezing order application, therefore, the court must be convinced that:

the claimant has a substantive cause of action against the [potential] defendant and a good arguable case;
there is a real risk of dissipation of assets; and
the balance of convenience must be in favour of granting the order, bearing in mind the conduct of the claimant, the rights of/ impact upon any third parties who may be affected, and whether such an order would cause legitimate and disproportionate hardship for the defendant.

The case for the alternative

In circumstances where the test for a notification injunction appears to be the same as for a freezing injunction, then, why might a claimant opt for the middle ground, rather than going for the more extensive and intrusive option? There are a number of possible advantages:

The High Court confirmed in Holyoake that a notification injunction is a less invasive interference with a [potential] defendant’s dealings. It is therefore conceivable that a court might more readily be willing to grant such an order.
The fact that a notification injunction is not such a draconian remedy might more easily tip the ‘balance of convenience’ in the claimant’s favour.
On an application for an interim injunction a claimant is required to provide what is known as a cross-undertaking in damages – that is, an undertaking to compensate the defendant f it is ultimately decided that the order should not have been awarded. The undertaking in damages can be very substantial in the case of a freezing order application and the claimant may, in some cases, be required to provide security. It is possible that, because it is much less likely that a requirement merely to notify will put the defendant to any significant time or cost than will an order which freezes assets, a claimant may face a much less significant and burdensome undertaking on an application for a notification injunction.
Apart from providing the claimant with an opportunity to apply for a freezing order if and when any notification suggests that dissipation may be imminent, it is likely that the mere existence of a notification injunction sends a strong message to any [potential] defendant – both in terms of the claimant’s attitude and approach to the management of is claim generally; and as a deterrent against dissipation in any event.

Practical advice

Many are the cases in which a claimant lender is concerned that a [potential] defendant might seek to place assets beyond the reach of any judgment (and indeed experience indicates that defendants are increasingly sophisticated at doing so), but perhaps few are the cases in which it would be appropriate and worthwhile to apply for a freezing order. In the wake of the Holyoake case, however, mutuals may wish to adapt their strategic case review processes to include routine consideration of a notification injunction, in case that can provide a greater level of comfort in return for a lower level of risk.

___________________

[1] Holyoake & Anr v Candy & Ors [2016] EWHC 970 (Ch)

Dismissal of LIBOR manipulation claims

The drop in interest rates which accompanied the economic downturn in 2008 left many borrowers […]

The drop in interest rates which accompanied the economic downturn in 2008 left many borrowers who had taken interest rate hedging products confronted with much higher than expected payments to make to lenders. This led to a number of cases being brought against banks in which borrowers alleged that the banks had mis-sold the products, acting in breach of contract and/or in breach of duty by failing to provide adequate information and advice. Walker Morris has reported previously [1] on the developing body of case law in which the courts have been reluctant to find lenders liable. In the first reported case [2] in which the claimant also specifically raised allegations flowing from the LIBOR scandal [3], the High Court has ostensibly continued that theme, dismissing all claims pleaded against the lender in question. The full judgment will make interesting and informative reading for all mutuals and their professional advisors, but the principal legal points to note, along with some practical advice, are summarised below.

PAG’s claims

The claimant property investment and development company (PAG) bought several LIBOR-linked interest rate swap hedging products from the defendant bank (RBS) during the period 2004 – 2008. Following exposure of manipulation of the LIBOR rates by a number of banks, PAG brought a mis-selling claim on the following grounds:

Negligent misstatement. PAG argued that, having proffered any explanation of the products which it wished to sell, RBS was under a duty [4] to provide a full, accurate and proper explanation of the nature and effect of the products, which it failed to do;
Misrepresentation as to the ‘hedging’ products and their suitability. PAG argued that the products did not provide a solution to, nor protect it from, interest rate risk, and they had left PAG in a worse financial position. It alleged that the products could not therefore be said to have been proper and suitable hedging agreements as RBS had represented;
Misrepresentation as to LIBOR. PAG alleged that RBS had made implied misrepresentations about LIBOR and how it was set and that PAG would not have entered into the swaps if it had known of the ongoing LIBOR manipulation; and
Breach of implied terms as to hedging interest rate risk, good faith and LIBOR.

High Court decision

PAG’s claims failed on all counts. Whether or not there was any underlying impetus not to open the floodgates for these types of claims, there is a sound legal and factual basis for the court’s findings. Taking each element of claim in turn:

No duty = no negligent misstatement. Any duty to advise had been expressly excluded by the terms of the contractual arrangements between PAG and RBS (hence there was no breach of contract claim for PAG to pursue in respect of the product information/explanation provided to it). Being mindful not to blur the distinction between a salesperson and an advisor; taking into account the specific characteristics of PAG [5] and the fact that it retained specialist banking advisors; and noting market practice as to the content and extent of information generally provided about interest-rate hedging products, the judge concluded that RBS had no duty to advise beyond a mere generic duty not to mislead. There being no such duty, the court concluded that RBS had not been guilty of negligent misstatement.
No hedging/suitability misrepresentation. The alleged misrepresentations as to the hedging nature of the products in question and their suitability for PAG were actually caught by the ‘non-reliance’ clauses in the contractual arrangements between the parties. PAG was therefore contractually estopped from relying on any such representations to found a claim.
No misrepresentation as to LIBOR. The court confirmed that the correct approach for ascertaining implied misrepresentations was to judge objectively what a reasonable person would have inferred was being implicitly represented by the bank’s words and conduct in their context. Mere presentation of swap agreements which were linked to LIBOR (as happened here) was not sufficient to amount to conduct from which the reasonable representee would infer that representations as to LIBOR, and how it was being set, were being made by RBS.
No breach of implied terms as to hedging, good faith or LIBOR. In accordance with the recent Supreme Court case of M&S v BNP Paribas [6], the implication of terms into contracts is potentially intrusive and will not be done lightly. The court will ask whether implication is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. Where the parties have entered into a lengthy, carefully drafted contract, particularly where they have been legally advised, it will be difficult to imply any term(s) as it will be doubtful whether any omission was the result of the parties’ oversight or a deliberate decision. In addition, for a term to be implied, it must be obvious; capable of clear expression; and must not contradict any express term of the contract. The contracts between PAG and RBS, two sophisticated commercial entities, were detailed, industry-standard arrangements which expressly excluded equitable and fiduciary duties. To imply terms as to the nature and suitability of the hedging and as to good faith was not necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and would be contrary to those express exclusion clauses. The same reasoning prevented terms as to LIBOR-setting being implied, plus the conduct of unknown banks on the LIBOR-setting panel would not have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contracts were made.

WM Comment and practical advice

Lenders and potential claimants alike have been awaiting the PAG v RBS decision. Whilst it is now anticipated that this comprehensive, fully reasoned dismissal of all PAG’s claims will deter some less confident claimants from pursuing claims, it is not likely, however, that this case will preclude all such post-LIBOR scandal litigation.

The judge considered in a very careful and detailed manner all of the arguments raised by PAG and many of her decisions turned on the particular facts of this case – for example, the specific contractual arrangements and the nature of this claimant and its retained advisors. It is quite possible to envisage a scenario where the arrangements between a lender and a less sophisticated borrower might have an entirely different outcome, as may a case in which express non-reliance terms do not exist or are not effective to exclude particular representations which may have been made by a lender’s sales staff and are relied upon by an individual investor.

Mutuals would be well advised to undertake a review of any cases in which LIBOR-linked product sales have been the subject of complaint or claim in light of this decision and to take expert advice, in particular, as to the existence of any relevant contractual terms or exclusions and the nature of any potential claimants and the extent of the society’s relationships with them.

Mutuals may also wish to review the terms of their standard contractual/loan agreements to ensure that future deals are protected so far as possible from misrepresentation/misstatement claims generally, and to educate their sales staff as to the extent to which their sales patter should – or should not – include product information and explanation.

________________

[1] See our earlier briefings: https://www.walkermorris.co.uk/publications/banking-matters-summer-2016/lenders-lack-advisory-duty-finch-v-lloyds/; https://www.walkermorris.co.uk/publications/banking-matters-january-2016/caution-for-interest-rate-swap-claimants/
[2] Property Alliance Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch)
[3] That is the scandal, initially exposed in 2012, in which several UK and international banks were found to have manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to which loan or swap agreements were and are often linked
[4] See Crestsign v Natwest and RBS [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 133
[5] PAG was not unsophisticated, but neither was it an expert in banking
[6] [2015] UKSC 72 – see our more detailed briefing

Who we are and what we do – Mutual Matters – January 2017

Handlebars, high peaks and speed-quizzing Never known to shy away from a good laugh for […]

Handlebars, high peaks and speed-quizzing

Never known to shy away from a good laugh for a good cause (nor from a skit photo shoot, it would seem!), members of the Banking Litigation team shunned their shavers in ‘Movember 2016’, raising a fantastic £600+ for men’s health charities. Since the team started undertaking the Movember challenge some years ago, it has raised over £3,000! Thank you to all those who have offered their support.

Various other members of the Banking Litigation team are also rising to the charity challenge this year, as they train to take on the Yorkshire 3 Peaks in aid of Candlelighters, Walker Morris’ charity for 2017, in July. Please get in touch with Louise Power if you’d like to take part!

There must be a joke somewhere about a room full of lawyers competing, not to win a case, but to win a quiz… In any event, you haven’t appreciated what competition looks like until you’ve seen a Walker Morris in-house speed quiz! In late January, and again in aid of Candlelighters, the Banking Litigation team will take on teams from right across the firm to compete in what has fast become one of the most contentious events of the Walker Morris calendar… and this time the team will be defending its speed-quizzing title!

Big hitters

Walker Morris’ Banking Litigation team and Housing Litigation and Management team are looking forward to socialising with clients at the Betway PDC Premier League Darts in February. The event is billed as promising “an evening of high quality, explosive darts full of twist and turns”… and that’s even before our ‘big hitters’ get the rounds in!

In-house insight

Walker Morris’ Christina Gill has recently returned to the Banking Litigation team after an eight-month secondment to a client’s Retail Legal team. Christina hugely enjoyed the exciting opportunity that the secondment represented, and brings back with her an invaluable insight to the commercial realities and concerns of a retail lender’s in-house legal team.

Client training

Karl is head of Walker Morris’ Housing Litigation & Management Team. Karl’s clients include lending institutions, fixed charge receivers and registered providers of social housing, amongst others. Karl was recently very pleased to receive excellent feedback from a training session he has delivered to clients about lease forfeiture – an issue on which he advises a variety of clients regularly, and which is rarely straightforward.

All of Walker Morris’ specialist lawyers are happy to help clients with their individual training requirements. If you would be interested in speaking to us about your business’ training needs, please do not hesitate to get in touch.

Contacts

Richard Sandford, Partner, Banking Litigation

Richard Sandford
Partner
Learn More