Insolvency Matters – March 2022

Welcome to the latest issue of Insolvency Matters, the newsletter from the Insolvency and Restructuring Group at Walker Morris rounding up recent significant cases and future developments in the insolvency and restructuring arena.

Challenging proofs of debt
Why is the case interesting? The judgment in Re Farrar Construction Ltd is a welcome […]
Why is the case interesting?
The judgment in Re Farrar Construction Ltd is a welcome authority on the issue of the burden of proof in circumstances where one creditor challenges the admission of a proof of debt from another creditor.
Background to the case
The case[1] was an application to court under Rule 4.83(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 by Levi Solicitors LLP (Levi), as a major creditor of Farrar Construction Limited (Farrar), for relief in relation to a proof of debt of JKR Property Development Limited (JKR). The proof was admitted by David Wilson who was the supervisor of Farrar’s Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA).
Under Rule 4.83(2), a creditor who is dissatisfied with a liquidator’s decision on another creditor’s proof may apply to the court for the decision to be reversed or varied. On such an application, the court conducts a re-hearing rather than a review of the liquidator’s decision. The court’s task is to examine all relevant evidence and decide whether, on balance, the claim against the company is established, and if so in what amount.
Levi sought directions from the court that JKR’s proof of debt should be rejected on the basis that it was not sufficiently established. Prior to the hearing, a list of issues was agreed between the parties and the amount for which the proof was admitted by Mr Wilson was no longer in issue. The court was tasked with the question of who had the burden of proof on the application; Levi as applicant or JKR as second respondent.
What did the court decide?
The court noted that, up until now, no authority had established where the burden of proof lies when one creditor challenges the admission of the proof of another. It was JKR’s position that the burden should lie on the applicant who seeks to disturb a decision taken by a supervisor of a CVA. It was Levi’s position that the burden should lie on the creditor seeking to have their proof admitted to establish their claim.
The judge found that, in situations where the matter is considered in a re-hearing capacity rather than a review of the decision taken, it is for the creditor asserting the claim to prove it. Mr Justice Fancourt stated “…if there is a bona fide challenge to the admission of a proof and a re-hearing in consequence, the proving creditor should have to make good their claim. The legal burden and the evidential burden will then coincide.”
WM Comment
The outcome of this case provides welcome clarity to the issue of where the burden of proof lies when there are competing proofs of debt.
[1] Re Farrar Construction Ltd; Levi Solicitors LLP v Wilson and another [2022] EWHC 24 (Ch)

First use of a restructuring plan for a company in administration
The High Court[1] has sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of […]
The High Court[1] has sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (Amicus) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the Restructuring Plan). The Restructuring Plan was the first to be proposed by insolvency officeholders and also involved the exercise of the court’s power to ‘cram down’ a dissenting class of creditors. The case demonstrates that a Part 26A restructuring plan can be used by administrators as a tool for rescuing a company as a going concern following an administration. Amicus is also the first mid-market company to use a Part 26A restructuring plan and so the decision may help pave the way for more mid-market companies to use the process.
Key points of interest
The key takeaways arising from the judgment are:
- Burden of proof for the ‘no worse off test’ – Where the court is asked to exercise its power to cram down a dissenting class, it was for the administrators of Amicus (as proponents of the Restructuring Plan) to satisfy the court that, on the balance of probabilities, no member of the dissenting class would be any worse off under the plan than it would be in the relevant alternative of an immediate liquidation.
- Class composition – The court will be careful to ensure that classes are being composed in the most appropriate manner and will apply real scrutiny. Focus will be on the rights held by the creditors rather the identity of the creditors that held them or that one creditor might vote in more than one class.
- Complaints against insolvency officeholders – Allegations regarding the conduct of the administrators will not influence the exercise of the court’s discretion to sanction the plan.
- Explanatory Statements – Explanatory statements must provide sufficient information to enable creditors to make an informed decision, not “the fullest specific information reasonably obtainable”.
- Court’s role in sanctioning a plan – Compliance with the statutory requirements for a cross-class cram down did not mean that the court was required to sanction the Restructuring Plan, this remains a matter for the court’s discretion. The role of the court is to scrutinise the plan to ensure a fair outcome for creditors within the desired timescale.
- Uncertainty of returns – It was not material that returns under the Restructuring Plan were uncertain, as returns in a liquidation would be even more so due to the lack of immediately available funding.
Background to the case
Amicus Finance plc provided short-term property finance. Administrators were appointed in 2018, but by early 2021 the administration was no longer considered financially viable. The administrators proposed a restructuring plan under Part 26A CA 2006, which they concluded would provide creditors with a better return than would be achieved in a liquidation and enable Amicus to be rescued as a going concern. The purpose of the Restructuring Plan was to compromise the company’s liabilities to allow it to return to solvency and consisted of three key elements:
- the injection of new shareholder and loan funding;
- the making of certain lump sum payments from this funding to ‘expense creditors’ (whose claims would otherwise be treated as an expense of the administration), preferential creditors in full satisfaction of their debts and to secured and unsecured creditors in part satisfaction of their debts;
- a waterfall of payments to secured and unsecured creditors, which would be funded by the repayments (if any) made to Amicus under certain legacy loans during a specified period following sanction of the Restructuring Plan.
However a secured creditor, Crowdstacker (an online peer-to-peer lending platform), opposed the plan. Amicus asked the court to exercise its power of cross-class cram down to sanction the plan despite Crowdstacker’s opposition. In order to sanction the restructuring plan the court needed to be satisfied that the two conditions in section 901A of the Companies Act 2006 had been met. First that Crowdstacker would not be any worse off under the restructuring plan than the ‘relevant alternative’ which in this case was liquidation (Condition A) and second that the plan was a ‘compromise or arrangement’ (Condition B).
The dispute centred around Condition A since all parties agreed that Condition B had been met. The court held that Condition A had been met for two reasons. First, that on the balance of probabilities, Crowdstacker would not be worse off under the plan than it would be if Amicus entered liquidation and second, while clawback claims can be taken into account, a detailed investigation into clawback claims cannot take place in a sanction hearing.
WM Comment
The new restructuring plan introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 appears to be gathering momentum and this case is interesting since it is the first time that the procedure has been used in the mid-market. To discuss any of the issues raised please contact Gawain Moore or your usual contact within the Restructuring team.
[1] Re Amicus Finance plc (in administration) [2021] EWHC 3036 (Ch)

Fraud and a claim of ‘knowing receipt’
The collapse of the Saad Group in 2009 continues to give rise to interesting legal […]
The collapse of the Saad Group in 2009 continues to give rise to interesting legal developments relating to the creditors’ pursuit of recoveries following the allegations of fraud involving those behind the Saad Group. The latest judgment[1] is a case in point. Whilst the case ultimately turned on aspects of Saudi Arabian law, the principles examined are of interest to anyone in the UK looking to advance a claim in knowing receipt.
Key point of interest
The key practical point to note from the judgment is that it clarifies the scope and limits of an important tool available in a claimant’s pursuit of allegedly stolen assets and of those alleged to have stolen them. The claimants’ argument was that since the ‘knowing receipt’ cause of action was personal, and not itself proprietary in nature, they only had to prove their beneficial interest in the assets and unconscionable receipt on the part of the defendant – it was irrelevant that local law gave the defendant good title. That argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
Background to the case
The facts of the case are complex and too numerous to set out in this short article but suffice to say, the individual behind Saad Group had declared trusts over shares in five Saudi Arabian banks in favour of Saad Investments Company Limited (SICL), a company registered in the Cayman Islands. Provisional liquidators were appointed over SICL by the Cayman court in 2009 and shortly afterwards the shares were transferred to Samba (a Saudi Arabian bank) in part discharge of a large debt. The liquidator claimed that the shares had been transferred in breach of trust and that Samba was liable as a knowing recipient of the shares because it knew that the shares were held on trust for SICL, or was sufficiently on notice of it.
The issue to be determined by the High Court and subsequently the Court of Appeal, was whether the claim, pleaded by SICL’s liquidators as governed by Cayman Islands or English law, must fail if SICL’s interest in the shares was extinguished.
What did the court say?
The High Court (and subsequently the Court of Appeal) found in favour of Samba. It held that “SICL had no continuing proprietary interest in the Disputed Securities [shares] after the [September Transfer] capable of supporting a claim against Samba in knowing receipt”. Under Saudi Arabian law, SICL’s interest in the shares was extinguished on the transfer to Samba. The Court of Appeal expanded on this by saying that a continuing proprietary interest in the relevant property (in this case shares) is required for a knowing receipt claim to be possible. A defendant cannot be liable for knowing receipt if he took the property free of any interest of the claimant.
WM Comment
Walker Morris have a highly respected corporate fraud and asset recovery team, particularly experienced in acting for insolvency office holders bringing such claims in the UK and overseas. Speak to Gawain Moore for more details.
[1] Byers v Saudi National Bank [2022] EWCA Civ 43

Insolvency Service gets tough on covid support fraud
The bounce back loan scheme was one of several financial support systems put in place […]
The bounce back loan scheme was one of several financial support systems put in place to help businesses survive the restrictions imposed during the height of the covid-19 pandemic. About one in four UK businesses applied for a bounce back loan and the funds provided approximately £47.4 billion of credit via 1.6 million loans. For many businesses the support has worked as intended, proving to be the difference between continuing to trade and entering insolvency.
While the scheme was heralded as the way for small businesses to quickly and easily access loans of between £2,000 and £50,000, there were concerns at the time that the speed and ease at which the loans could be obtained would be open to abuse by fraudsters. Bounce back loans were particularly vulnerable to fraudulent activity due to the limited due diligence and underwriting checks which were carried out. Those concerns have turned into reality with numerous reports of businesses obtaining loans fraudulently. Since the start of 2022, examples include a caravan company obtaining £50,000 even though it had ceased trading the previous year, a school tuition company fraudulently obtaining £50,000 even though on investigation the company didn’t meet the required criteria, another educational company obtaining a £50,000 loan when it was only entitled to a loan of £10,000 and a car break down business obtaining the full amount which was subsequently spent on funding the director’s drug habit.
The Insolvency Service has been very vocal on its drive to crack down on those directors and companies that have misused the Covid support schemes. Sue Tovey of the Insolvency Service has said “Taxpayers’ money was made available to help genuine businesses get through the lockdown period and where there have been abuses, we will not hesitate to take action”. If misconduct is found, directors can face sanctions, including being disqualified as a company director for up to 15 years or, in the most serious of cases, prosecution.
It is important to remember that bounce back loans are a debt and have terms and conditions attached from the lender. Failure to account for how the bounce back loan was used or using it for personal payments can result in disqualification as a director. In addition, as loan repayments become due following the 12 month repayment holiday, the Insolvency Service is warning that there may be an increase in directors and debtors considering formal insolvency, amongst other things to avoid repayment of the bounce back loans.
WM Comment
It seems inevitable that we will see a large number of insolvencies of businesses which have abused this lifeline and consequential litigation by insolvency officeholders could keep the Courts busy for years to come.

Is a shake-up of the UK insolvency profession inevitable?
On 21 December 2021, the UK government launched a consultation called ‘The future of insolvency regulation‘ […]
On 21 December 2021, the UK government launched a consultation called ‘The future of insolvency regulation‘ which proposes significant changes to the way that the insolvency profession is regulated.
The current regime
Currently, the UK’s insolvency practitioners (IPs) are regulated solely as individuals, with no specific regulation of firms offering insolvency services. The government says that this creates the potential for conflict between the interests of the firm and the statutory duties of the IP. In addition, the supervision of a relatively small number of IPs is currently carried out by four professional bodies and the government which is seen as top-heavy. The consultation states that despite close collaboration between regulators and the Insolvency Service, the current model has not achieved the levels of consistency, independence and transparency which were envisioned following the introduction of statutory objectives for regulators in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
Government plans
The government has concluded that the current regulatory regime is no longer fit for purpose. It says that the way IPs are regulated (as individuals) has not kept pace with changes in the way the insolvency market operates, with an increase in practitioners now working as an employee of a firm employing several IPs.
The consultation sets out plans to reform, strengthen, and modernise the insolvency regulatory regime with the main proposals being:
- the creation of a single, independent government regulator to sit within the Insolvency Service
- regulation to be extended to all firms as well as individual IPs
- the introduction of a public register of authorised IPs and insolvency practices containing details of any sanctions imposed
- a formal compensation scheme
- limited reforms of the IP bonding scheme.
The government proposes to use primary legislation to create a single independent government regulator as mentioned above, who will be a statutory office holder. The regulator would have powers to authorise, regulate, and discipline individual IPs, as well as set regulatory standards. The regulator would also have the power to delegate certain functions to other suitable bodies. Crucially, the regulator would also have the power to regulate firms providing insolvency services, as well as individuals.
WM Comment
Responses to the consultation are requested by 25 March 2022 which isn’t much time if you wish to put forward your views. Although the consultation has a relatively short timescale, implementation of the proposals will not be quick as the reforms will require new legislation.

Prosecution of an administrator for failure to give notice of redundancies
The Divisional Court[1] has held that an administrator is an officer of the company for […]
The Divisional Court[1] has held that an administrator is an officer of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) and as such is liable to prosecution for failure to give the required advance notice to the Secretary of State of proposed redundancies. The decision was to allow the prosecution of the administrator to proceed, not to determine whether in the particular circumstances the administrator was guilty of the offence.
The decision underlines the importance of filing the notice, known as Form HR1, to the Secretary of State within the required timescale and highlights the tension that often arises when employment legislation is applied in insolvency situations. In making the case for judicial review, the administrator argued that that an obligation to give advance notice of the proposed redundancies could place the administrator in a position of conflict since it would be in the best interests of the creditors to cease trading immediately and realise the assets rather than pay the wages of the employees for a further 30 days.
Background to the case
West Coast Capital (USC) Limited (USC) was a company incorporated in England which traded as a retailer of clothing from premises located predominantly in the north of England as well as in Scotland. Following the service of a statutory demand by a supplier on 17 December 2014, USC’s sole director resolved to put USC into administration. Mr Palmer was appointed joint administrator on 13 January 2015 and a pre-pack sale of part of the business was completed while employees in the remaining business were notified that they were at risk of redundancy and invited to a consultation. However very soon after receiving the notice the employees were handed a further letter informing them that they had been dismissed. At this point the required Form HR1 had not been sent to the Secretary of State informing it of the proposed redundancies. On being contacted by the Redundancy Payments Service, Mr Palmer belatedly submitted a Form HR1 and stated that the late service had been an oversight.
Mr Palmer was subsequently charged by postal requisition issued by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State alleged that Mr Palmer “consented to, connived in, or neglected to prevent the failure by the Company to notify the Secretary of State of the proposed redundancies, contrary to s194(3) TULRCA“, in the period after the Company went into administration up until the receipt of the HR1. Mr Palmer challenged by way of judicial review the decision that he could be prosecuted since he argued that he wasn’t a “director, manager, secretary or other similar officer” of USC.
What did the court say?
Mr Palmer’s application was dismissed. The court held that an administrator can be prosecuted for an offence under section 194(3) of TULCRA. The intention of the legislation must have been that in principle anyone with responsibility for the day to day management and control of the company should be personally liable for the employer’s failure to give the statutory notices which they had brought about. In practical terms, once the administrator assumes office there is no-one else who could give the statutory notices on behalf of the company, unless they do so under his direction. The court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether an administrator is also a “manager of the company” although in practical terms there is a clear argument that an administrator carries out a managerial function during the administration.
WM Comment
We will have to wait for the outcome of the criminal prosecution to see whether, on the facts of the case, the administrator is found criminally liable for failing to file the HR1. The court accepted that making administrators criminally liable under TULCRA could lead to potential conflicts but that was a matter for Parliament to address not the courts.
[1] R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court [2021] EWHC 3013

The effect of material irregularity at a creditors’ meeting
Why does the case matter? Elser v Sands and others[1] is a relatively rare example […]
Why does the case matter?
Elser v Sands and others[1] is a relatively rare example of a full-blown trial of fact to determine which creditors could vote at a meeting. The outcome was that since there had been a material irregularity at the meeting of creditors, the creditors’ decision was reversed.
Background to the case
The case concerned an application to set aside a chairman’s decision to allow three creditors to vote at a meeting held for the purpose of approving an Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) for Rory McCarthy on 3 December 2018. Mr McCarthy, was an ex-investment banker turned investor and entrepreneur. He incurred substantial debts and was adjudged bankrupt on the petition of Mr Elser on 13 March 2018. In December 2018 he attempted to annul his bankruptcy by putting in place an IVA.
The creditors’ meeting was chaired by an insolvency practitioner, Mr Sands, and was attended by a number of parties. The chairman admitted certain debts to vote and the IVA was approved. However that decision was challenged in respect of three creditors: Mr Jamie Bond (£4,152,569), Mr Chris Jonns (£2,343,750) and OBN Investments Ltd (£3,000,000). These three creditors were the key disputed creditors and had any one of these claims been rejected the IVA would not have passed as there would not have been the required 75% creditor support for the IVA.
Mr Elser issued an application to challenge the creditors’ meeting decision on the grounds that there had been material irregularities. Under Rule 15.35 of the Insolvency Rules 2016, the result of a creditors’ meeting can be challenged if the challenge is brought within 21 days of the decision of the meeting. Mr Elser challenged the three creditors’ votes as irregularities, stated they should be removed from the quorum of the decision and requested either a reversal of the decision or that a new meeting should be called.
What did the court decide?
The court agreed with Mr Elser and, after exchange of witness statements, cross-examination, and thorough analysis by the court, held that there had been a material irregularity at the meeting of creditors. The court found that Mr Jonns was not a creditor, the amount owed to Mr Bond was incorrect and that OBN investments Ltd had subsequently withdrawn its proof of debt. There was therefore a material irregularity at the creditors’ meeting and the court opted, as provided for under the Insolvency Rules 2016, to reverse the decision rather than order a new meeting.
WM Comment
The case has shown that the court has a wide range of options open to it when there is a material irregularity challenge. If you need any specific advice in relation to creditors’ meetings, just pick up the phone to any of the restructuring team.
[1] Elser v Sands (as chairman of the meeting of creditors/joint nominee/joint supervisor of the voluntary arrangement in respect of Rory McCarthy) and others [2022] EWHC 32 (Ch)

What’s on the horizon in 2022?
With the government support packages due to come to an end, 2022 could be a […]
With the government support packages due to come to an end, 2022 could be a very busy year in the restructuring and insolvency arena. Here are a few highlights of what to expect.
Winding-up petitions
The current restrictions on winding-up petitions under Schedule 10 of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) are currently set to end on 31 March 2022. The restrictions mean that creditors cannot present a winding up petition for a debt worth less than £10,000 and even then, without first giving the debtor 21 days to pay and the opportunity to make proposals for payment. At the time of writing, there has been no indication from the government that the restrictions will be extended beyond March 2022 so the working assumption must be that the use of winding-up petitions will be free from restrictions as of 1 April 2022.
Commercial rent arrears
The Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Bill 2021-22 is likely to reach the statute book in the first quarter of 2022. It introduces an optional statutory arbitration process for commercial rent arrears that accrued while the tenant’s business was required to close due to coronavirus. The relevant arrears period can span from 21 March 2020 to (at the latest) 18 July 2021 (for England) and 7 August 2021 (for Wales).
There are restrictions on winding-up and bankruptcy petitions in respect of tenants owing such protected rent debt. As regards winding-up petitions, a landlord cannot petition between the date the Bill comes into effect and six months later (if the debt isn’t referred to arbitration) or until the arbitration concludes (if it is referred).
Director disqualifications
The Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Act 2021 received Royal Assent at the end of last year and the provisions relating to directors of dissolved companies came into force on 15 February 2022. The legislation gave the Insolvency Service new powers to disqualify directors of dissolved companies. It is the latest in a range of measures to tackle the practice of creating a phoenix company that can carry on the business established by a director, leaving behind liabilities accrued to the previous trading company that is simply struck off and dissolved.
First review of the Insolvency Rules 2016
The Insolvency Service must publish its first report on how the Insolvency Rules 2016 are operating in practice by April 2022. The report will highlight any significant gaps in law or situations covered by the rules, and any places in which the rules are contradictory or unclear.
Changes to the regulation of IPs
The consultation into the regulation of insolvency practitioners closes on 25 March 2022. The consultation proposes a radical reform of the system of regulating insolvency practitioners, including the move to a single governmental regulator. It also suggests interim measures to reform the bonding regime pending a potential new compensation regime. See our longer article here.
CVAs
In March 2022 the Court of Appeal will hear the appeal in the landlords’ challenge to the New Look CVA. The outcome of the case will have an important role to play in the continued use of CVAs as a restructuring tool in cases where landlords challenge their use to cram down specific types of creditor, while leaving other unsecured creditors unaffected. If restrictions are put on the use of CVAs, it is likely we will see a resulting increase in the use of the new restructuring plan process, which was introduced by CIGA in 2020.
WM Comment
To discuss any of the above topics in more detail please contact Gawain Moore or Claire Askew.

Who can appeal a deferral of dissolution?
In what appears to be the first reported decision[1] relating to an appeal under section […]
In what appears to be the first reported decision[1] relating to an appeal under section 205(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 205), the court has considered a number of aspects which, in the absence of statutory guidance and, until now, judicial comment, are relevant to appeals where the early dissolution of a company is opposed. One of the key issues considered was who could bring an appeal.
What is the legal framework?
Section 205 governs the process for dissolving a company in compulsory liquidation. Section 205 applies where the registrar of companies receives either (a) from the liquidator, a final account and statement sent under section 146(4) Insolvency Act 1986; or (b) a notice from the official receiver that the winding up of a company by the court is complete. The company will be dissolved at the end of the period of 3 months following receipt of the final account and statement or notice the company is to be dissolved. Section 205(3), however, states that the Secretary of State may, on the application of the official receiver or any other person who appears to the Secretary of State to be interested, give a direction deferring the date at which the dissolution of the company is to take effect for such period as the Secretary of State thinks fit. This decision can be appealed on application to court.
However, as the judge in the current case noted, Section 205 does not set out how the court should approach an appeal, who can bring an appeal or the grounds on which an appeal may be brought.
What did the court say?
Along with useful commentary on the procedure under Section 205, the case confirms that a proper person with a “legitimate interest” in the relief being sought can appeal under Section 205. In this particular case, the appeal was brought by a director/shareholder of the company who was asking for the deferral period to be brought to an end on the basis that it served no purpose, all investigations had been concluded, and that the applicant/director was being affected by its continuance. The court also confirmed that an appeal under Section 205 is governed by Civil Procedure Rule 52.
[1] Kumar v Secretary of State for BEIS (1) and Official Receiver (2) [2021] EWHC 2965 (Ch)